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Abstract 
In 1961 Frantz Fanon scathingly characterised the emerging African elite as a 
bourgeoisie of the civil service. Many others have since described Africa’s public 
sector employees as a privileged rentier class that grew disproportionately large in 
relation to the continent’s under-developed private sector. Is this characterisation 
accurate? Using household budget survey and administrative data from Kenya and 
Tanzania, this paper aims to situate public sector employees in two African countries 
within their respective national income distributions and establish the share of high-
income households that were headed by public servants. It finds that while public 
sector employees formed a considerable share of the top 1% - 0.1% at independence, 
their share of the broader middle class was never that large and fell substantially over 
the postcolonial era. In 1975 Kenyan public sector employees comprised roughly 36% 
of the top income decile, but by 1994 this ratio had dropped to 30% and by 2005/06 to 
17%. In Tanzania the public sector share of the top decile fell from an estimated 25% 
in 1969 to 14% in 2011/12. In both countries moreover, public sector-headed 
households relied on multiple income sources to meet household consumption needs 
during the economic crises of the 1980s and early 1990s. Without recourse to 
secondary incomes from farming, businesses or other employment, public sector-
headed households would have seen a considerably larger relative income decline. 
The corollary to the declining share of public sector employees among high income 
earners was an increase in the share of private sector employees and business 
owners at the top of the income distribution. This suggests that after a long teething 
period, East Africa’s private sector may finally be coming into its own. 
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Introduction 
Many of Africa’s early independence scholars have argued that public servants 
comprised an unusually large share of the richest ranks of postcolonial African 
society.1 They feared that this dominant public sector elite would crowd out the 
continent’s under-developed private sector and make the upper and middle classes 
too beholden to the state to act as an independent economic interest group and 
counterweight to the political class. During the economic downturn of the 1980s and 
early 1990s such research on class stratification in Africa waned, but the resurgence 
in economic growth in the 2000s has revived the academic interest in the topic once 
more. A flurry of recent papers have speculated that Africa’s middle class may finally 
be coming into its own, embodied by a young, assertive, urban, private sector-oriented 
elite, contrasted with the public sector elite of the 1960s.2 Other scholars, however, 
have treaded more cautiously, questioning the relevance of class analysis to the 
African context and cautioning that the same political power dynamics as in earlier 
periods will determine who gains during this latest growth episode.3  
The distinction between an ‘old’ and ‘new’ middle class has also emerged in literature 
on the global middle classes. It posits the old, traditional middle class, which was 
dominated by public sector employees and other professionals and espoused 
‘collectivist, national modernization paradigms’, against the new middle class which 
promotes neoliberal values, celebrating entrepreneurship, global linkages and trade.4 
Parker’s work on Latin America makes a similar point, while Donner and De Neve 
discuss the Indian context.5 Do we see a similar shift in Africa? 
Recent literature on this topic is inconclusive. Antoinette Handley discusses the extent 
to which an independent private sector is emerging in Africa, cautiously concluding 
that the private sector is playing a larger role in the African economy today.6 Leonardo 
Arriola’s recent work on financial liberalisation in Africa argues that some of the 
structural adjustment reforms of the 1980s and 1990s has reduced the state’s control 
                                                          
1
 Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1963); Issa G. Shivji, Class 
Struggles in Tanzania (London: Heinemann, 1976); Rene Dumont, False Start in Africa (New York: 
Praeger Publishers, 1966); Larry Diamond, ‘Class Formation in the Swollen African State’, The 
Journal of Modern African Studies, 25.4 (1987), 567–96. 
2
 Maurice Mubila and Mohamed-Safouane Ben Aissa, The Middle of the Pyramid: Dynamics of the 
Middle Class in Africa, Market Brief (Tunis, 2011); Mthuli Ncube and Charles Leyeka Lufumpa, The 
Emerging Middle Class in Africa (New York: Routledge, 2015).  
3
 For a discussion of this debate, see: Antoinette Handley, ‘Varieties of Capitalists? The Middle-Class, 
Private Sector and Economic Outcomes in Africa’, Journal of International Development, 27 (2015), 
609–27; Scott D. Taylor, Globalization and the Cultures of Business in Africa: From Patrimonialism to 
Profit (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012). 
4
 Rachel Heiman, Carla Freeman and Mark Liechty, ‘Introduction: Charting an Anthropology of the 
Middle Classes’, in The Global Middle Classes: Theorising through Ethnography (Santa Fe: School 
for Advanced Research Press, 2012), p. 15. 
5
 David Parker, ‘Introduction: The Making and Endless Remaking of the Middle Class’, in Latin 
America’s Middle Class: Unsettled Debates and New Histories, ed. by David Parker and Louise 
Walker (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2013); H. Donner and G. De Neve, ‘Introduction’, in Being Middle 
Class in India: A Way of Life, ed. by H. Donner (London: Routledge, 2011). 
6
 Handley. 
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over the credit market and helped to empower a new business elite, better able to 
challenge the political status quo through support to opposition parties.7 This paper 
contributes to the debate by examining where East Africa’s ‘privileged’ public sector 
employees fell within their respective national income distributions. Did state 
employment create the postcolonial elite and middle class? Has its importance 
withered with time? 
The case study countries were driven by practical considerations. Both Kenya and 
Tanzania publish an array of data series and surveys on employment and earnings. 
Questions of class and income inequality have also received considerable attention in 
both countries and as a result there is a rich secondary literature to lean on. 
Furthermore, other studies have used the Kenya-Tanzania matched pair design to 
compare two countries with similar endowments but different political trajectories after 
independence, using them to contrast Tanzania’s African socialism with Kenya’s 
capitalist orientation.8 In this case, however, the focus is on similarities rather than 
differences. The objective is to see how two countries with different political trajectories 
conform to the stylized story of an excessively influential public service, and whether 
the changes wrought by the economic crises of the 1980s and 1990s and subsequent 
structural adjustment reforms were similar in the two countries. 
The history and theory of Africa’s ‘bureaucratic bourgeoisie’ 
An urban, African elite was slow to develop in British East Africa in the first half of the 
20th century, as colonial rule curtailed social upward mobility by restricting the 
economic activities open to Africans and limiting their opportunities to gain higher 
education.9 Africans in Kenya and Tanzania held less than a third of mid- and senior-
level positions in government around 1960, and even fewer senior roles in private 
industries.10 Only towards the end of the colonial period did colonial governments 
begin a hurried expansion of the secondary and tertiary education systems with the 
explicit aim of educating Africans to the level required to replace European and Asian 
public servants in mid- and senior cadres. Colonial governments in East Africa also 
chose to retain the colonial wage structure, bringing Africans in senior positions up to 
the salary levels of their European predecessors, rather than establishing a new pay 
scale tailored to local market conditions.11 This came to concentrate most of the 
                                                          
7
 Leonardo R. Arriola, ‘Capital and Opposition in Africa: Coalition Building in Multiethnic Societies’, 
World Politics, 65.2 (2013), 233–72. 
8
 Joel D. Barkan, Politics and Public Policy in Kenya and Tanzania, ed. by Joel D. Barkan (New York: 
Praeger, 1984); Richard H. Sabot and John B. Knight, Education, Productivity, and Inequality : The 
East African Natural Experiment (Oxford ; New York: Published for the World Bank, Oxford University 
Press, 1990); Paul Nugent, Africa since Independence, 2nd edn (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012). 
9
 Diamond; Mahmood Mamdani, Define and Rule: Native as Political Identity (Cambridge and London: 
Harvard University Press, 2012).  
10
 Kenya. Ministry of Economic Planning and Development, High-Level Manpower Requirements and 
Resources in Kenya, 1964-1970 (Nairobi, 1965); Government of Tanganyika, Report of the 
Africanisation Commission (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1962).  
11
 Paul Bennell, “The Colonial Legacy of Salary Structures in Anglophone Africa,” The Journal of 
Modern African Studies 20, no. 01 (November 11, 1982).  
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educated, high-earning manpower in the public sector. Around the same time 
governments introduced minimum wages for low-skilled urban workers, most of whom 
worked in the public sector, which raised their earnings relative to unskilled rural 
workers.12 
These conditions spawned various theories about public sector privilege. Neo-Marxist 
scholars of the 1960s and 70s predicted that the over-representation of politicians and 
public servants in the African national elite would create a rentier class that would align 
itself with foreign interests and hinder the emergence of an indigenous capitalist 
class.13 In 1961 Frantz Fanon spoke of Africa’s ‘bourgeoisie of the civil service’, which 
he expected would subsume the role of its colonial predecessors and perpetuate the 
social inequalities of the colonial era.14 In 1962 Rene Dumont provocatively criticised 
the level of excess and corruption he had observed in Francophone Africa, likening 
African elites to ‘a modern version of Louis XVI’s court’, and asserting that ‘[a] new 
type of bourgeoisie is forming in Africa, that Karl Marx would hardly have foreseen, a 
bourgeoisie of the civil service’.15  
In the 1980s the public choice theorists shifted the focus from class to interest group.16 
They argued that civil servants and urban public sector workers were 
disproportionately powerful interest groups that used their lobbying power to ensure 
high wages and low food prices, at the expense of an over-taxed peasantry.  
The neopatrimonialism school in contrast, which came to the fore in the 1990s, 
dispensed of both class and interest groups and instead highlighted ethnic fractures 
in African societies. 17 As a result, they argued, politicians ruled by dispensing 
patronage in the form of public sector jobs to ethnic leaders and their followers in 
exchange for political support.  Diamond puts it succinctly when he describes how 
African ‘state offices become “entitlements”, giving incumbents immense discretion to 
use the patronage resources of office not only to enrich themselves, but to assist 
                                                          
12
 Frederick Cooper, Decolonization and African Society: The Labor Question in French and British 
Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
13
 Fanon; Shivji; Mahmood Mamdani, Politics and Class Formation in Uganda (New York and London: 
Monthly Review Press, 1976); Giovanni Arrighi and John S. Saul, ‘Socialism and Economic 
Development in Tropical Africa’, Journal of Modern African Studies, 6.2 (1968), 141–69.Paul Bennell, 
‘The Colonial Legacy of Salary Structures in Anglophone Africa’, The Journal of Modern African 
Studies, 20.01 (1982), 127; Arrighi and Saul. 
14
 Fanon, p. 179.   
15
 Dumont, p. 78; 81. 
16
 Robert H. Bates, Markets and States in Tropical Africa : The Political Basis of Agricultural Policies 
(Berkeley and London: University of California Press, 1981). 
17
 Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz, Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument (James 
Currey Publishers, 1999); Pierre Englebert, ‘Pre-Colonial Institutions, States, and in Economic 
Development Tropical Africa’, Political Research Quarterly, 53.1 (2000), 7–36; Daron Acemoglu and 
James A. Robinson, ‘Why Is Africa Poor?’, Economic History of Developing Regions, 25.1 (2010), 21–
50; Michael Bratton and Nicolas Van De Walle, ‘Neopatrimonial Regimes and Political Transitions in 
Africa’, World Politics, 46.4 (1994), 453–89. 
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clients and followers and thereby maintain - and perhaps enlarge - their political 
base.’18  
While conceptualising power dynamics in distinct ways, these three theories 
nonetheless rest on a similar analysis of Africa’s postcolonial predicament: resources 
extracted from society were captured by public sector employees and therefore not 
invested productively. Furthermore, the lack of a healthy private sector limited 
government oversight, as there was no independent power base that could hold 
governments to account. These assertions rest on the assumption that public servants 
comprised a large share of the comparative wealthy Africans, and that there was little 
change to these wealth and power relations after independence. Does the empirical 
evidence support such claims? 
Defining and measuring the upper and middle ‘classes’ 
This study builds on the assumption that the economic interests of wealthier members 
of society reflect the policy priorities of the state. But how should this wealthy strata be 
defined? At what levels of income, wealth or occupational status do interest groups 
form and gain political leverage? Many of studies cited above are imprecise about the 
contours of the privileged public sector elite or middle class that they describe. While 
some conceptualize power in Africa as dominated by a small clique of politicians with 
little co-optation of a broader middle class,19 others assume that political power rests 
with a relatively broad group of middle class denizens.  
Among those studies of social stratification in Africa that do give precise definitions, 
there are a wide range of alternative approaches. A landmark study on Africa’s new 
elites from 1966 defined this elite as those earning at least £250 per year and with a 
western education, which put the Kenyan African elite at just below 1% of the labour 
force.20 Issa Shivji’s study of Tanzania, which coined the term ‘bureaucratic 
bourgeoisie’ similarly gave it a narrow definition.21 Shivji’s bureaucratic bourgeoisie 
comprised political heads of government ministries and departments, top civil 
servants, top positions in the judiciary, military and party, in combination with economic 
functionaries in senior roles in the parastatals and public corporations. This description 
of the bourgeoisie puts it a few thousand people, or in the order of 0.1% of the labour 
force at the time of the book’s writing.  
At the other extreme the African Development Bank recently chose to characterise 
Africa’s middle class as individuals with a daily consumption of between US$2-20 (in 
                                                          
18
 Diamond, p. 582. 
19
 Nicholas van de Walle, ‘Meet the New Boss, Same as the Old Boss?  The Evolution of Political 
Clientelism in Africa’, in Patrons, Clients, and Policies: Patterns of Democratic Accountability and 
Political Competition, ed. by Herbert Kitschelt and Steven Wilkinson (Cambridge University Press, 
2007), pp. 50–67; Henning Melber, The Rise of Africa’s Middle Class: Myths, Realities and Critical 
Engagements (London: Zed Books, 2016). 
20
 Based on the EES income distribution and assuming that wage employees were the only Kenyans 
fitting this description. 
21
 Shivji. 
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PPP terms), subdivided into a floating class (US$2-4), lower middle class ($4-10), and 
upper middle class ($10-20).22 While this broader definition put the continent’s middle 
class at 34%, restricting it to the lower and upper middle class reduces the share to 
13%. This approach follows Banerjee and Duflo’s work on the global middle class 
which used similarly low thresholds.23  Implicit in these middle class definitions is the 
assumption that a larger pool of people with incomes even just a little above 
subsistence give more people an incentive and ability to engage in political matters 
beyond those of immediate survival concern. 
Whether such strata have any analytical content however, remains an open question. 
The language of class invokes Marx and Weber, who conceptualised classes as 
distinct interest groups in conflict with each other. Marx defined class in relation to its 
ownership of the means of production, with a working class that sells its labour while 
the bourgeoisie owns capital and employs labour; in between them is a petty bourgeois 
middle tier of small shop and business owners who sometimes ally with the 
bourgeoisie and other times with the working class.24 The Marxist literature recognizes 
these groups as classes only once its members become aware of their common 
economic interests (‘class in itself’) and organise collectively to defend said interests 
(‘class for itself’).  
Many academics have contended that class in the Marxist or Weberian sense does 
not describe the African reality, where social stratification remain fluid and ethnic 
allegiances often trump economic interests. With reference to Kenya specifically, two 
recent articles have addressed this question empirically, by testing whether social 
strata based on income, consumption or analogous measures predict political and 
economic behaviour. Nic Cheeseman finds some signs that middle class Kenyans 
exhibit stronger support for traditional middle class values, while Deiter Neubert finds 
little evidence of a distinctly middle class politics.25 
This study, however, does not directly address the question of class formation or 
identity. Instead it starts from an empirical angle: are there signs of change to the 
composition of the elite that would signal the rise of new, or emboldened economic 
interest groups? Whether these groups represent classes in a Marxist or Weberian 
sense is a second-order question, but in cannot be answered without an 
                                                          
22
 Mubila and Ben Aissa. 
23
 Abhijit V Banerjee and Esther Duflo, ‘What Is Middle Class about the Middle Classes around the 
World?’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 22.2 (2008), 3–28. 
24
 For a good discussion, see: Roger Southall, The New Black Middle Class in South Africa 
(Johannesburg: Jacana Media, 2016). 
25
 Nic Cheeseman, ‘“No Bourgeoisie, No democracy?" The Political Attitudes of the Kenyan Middle 
Class’, Journal of International Development, 27 (2015), 647–64; Dieter Neubert, ‘Kenya - an 
Unconscious Middle Class?: Between Regional-Ethnic Political Mobilisation and Middle Class 
Lifestyles’, in The Rise of Africa’s Middle Class: Myths, Realities and Critical Engagements, ed. by 
Henning Melber (London: Zed Books, 2016). 
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understanding of the economic structure of society, and thus the ability to make 
predictions about interests and behaviour.26  
Because of the focus on the relative power of different interest groups, this paper uses 
relative wealth or income rather than absolute measures. It seeks to rank households 
in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda from poor to wealthy and locate where those headed 
by public sector employees fell in this rank order at different points in time. It will 
primarily use the top 1% and top 10% of the income or consumption distribution as a 
proxy for the upper and middle class respectively, allowing us to study the elite 
composition at two different levels of relative privilege. These are arbitrary cut-offs, but 
have the advantage of simplicity and precedence in the work of Thomas Piketty.27  
While the top 1% is roughly in keeping with Lloyd’s 1966 elite measure, the top 10% 
is a large enough group to be representative of something more substantial than the 
ruling clique, yet capturing a stratum of households living above subsistence. It is 
roughly in line with the AfDB’s contemporary definition of the stable middle class (per 
capita consumption of $4-20), but a far cry from the middle of the income distribution 
proper. 
Despite focusing on a comparatively high strata of society, the top 10% of East African 
households is not a wealthy group by international standards. Using the most recent 
estimates available based on household budget surveys, the average household in 
the top 10% of consumers lived on roughly US$13,000 per year in Kenya (2005/06) 
and US$7,500 in Tanzania (2011/12), equal to roughly US$7 per person per day in 
Kenya and US$4 per person and day in Tanzania (2010 dollars).28 The share of 
households in this top decile living in homes with piped, indoor water and electricity 
was 70% in Kenya, and the share who reported owning a refrigerator was 25% in 
Kenya in 2005/06 and 28% in Tanzania in 2011.29 With the caveat that household 
budget surveys are imperfect instruments for measuring the very top of the income 
distributions and most likely underestimate top income levels, the same surveys 
suggest that the average annual household consumption in the top 1% was 
US$40,000 in Kenya (2005/06) and US$19,000 in Tanzania (2011/12). Taking these 
estimates at face value suggests that only the top 1-0.5% of East African households 
would scrape into a British middle class definition.30 
                                                          
26
 This is analogous to Kitching’s distinction between ‘the “objective” structure of class and production 
relations and the “subjective” structure of consciousness, ideology and political factions’, see: Gavin 
Kitching, Class and Economic Change in Kenya: The Making of an African Petite-Bourgeoisie (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), p. 455. 
27
 Thomas Piketty also uses the top 10% and top 1% cut-off in his study of top incomes, see: Thomas 
Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 2014), chap. 8. 
28
 Calculated from the povcal net consumption shares and WDI total household consumption 
estimates in US$ 2010; assuming an average family size of five.  
29
 Calculated from: Kenya Integrated Household Budget Survey 2005/06 and Tanzania Household 
Budget Survey 2011/12.  
30
 Comparing it, roughly, to the Great British Class Survey stratifications, see: Mike Savage, Fiona 
Devine, and others, ‘A New Model of Social Class? Findings from the BBC’s Great British Class 
Survey Experiment’, Sociology, 47.2 (2013), 219–50., Table 6. 
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A remaining question and weakens therefore, to which we will return, is whether the 
top 1% is in fact too broad a measure to capture elite dynamics. Perhaps an even 
narrower 0.1% strata would nuance the story further. Unfortunately there are few 
sources that allow income disaggregation at such a high level of granularity and it is 
only possible to make speculative statements about income shares above the 1% 
mark. 
Africa’s public sector elite and a European point of reference 
Class or social group dynamics in Africa are typically defined in reference to such 
dynamics in the global north, not least because Marxist and Weberian analyses and 
predictions were premised on the 19th century European experience. Academics have 
speculated about how conditions particular to Sub-Saharan Africa, or former colonies 
in general, would generate a postcolonial ‘bourgeoisie’ with a different set of interests 
and characteristics to that which emerged in Europe a century earlier.31 This 
dichotomy between middle class development in the Global North versus Global 
South, however, has probably been overstated. Studies on the origins of the British 
middle class have stressed the importance of the state both as an employer and 
regulator of professional labour as early as the 18th century.32 While it is beyond the 
scope of this study to quantify the composition of Europe’s 18th and 19th century 
bourgeoisies for comparative purposes, it is possible to say what the contemporary 
literature predicts about social positions of public sector employees in advanced 
economies, and therefore, at least for the most recent period, provide a benchmark 
for the African country cases.  
Firstly, it is important to note that public services in wealthier economies tend to be 
considerably larger than in developing countries, with the UK public sector employing 
roughly 18% of the working population today compared to roughly 4% in East Africa.33 
In addition to its large size, the European public sector workforce is distinct in 
educational and gender terms, with a disproportionately large share of college and 
university graduates in public sector employment (given the comparatively high 
educational attainment of teachers, nurses and doctors). This skew is more 
accentuated among women than men.  
In the UK in 1995 for instance, public sector employees constituted 27% of 
economically active workers, but 41% of all economically active degree holders, and 
50% of all workers with other forms of higher education, according to the 1995 labour 
force survey. Women formed a much larger share public sector employees overall, but 
particularly so amongst the highly educated, with over 60% of higher educated women 
                                                          
31
 See: Nicholas van de Walle, Barrington Moore in the Tropics: Democracy and the African Middle 
Class, Political Economy of Regime Transitions Research Workshop, 2014. 
32
 See discussion in:  Mike Savage, James Barlow, and others, Property, Bureaucracy and Culture: 
Middle-Class Formation in Contemporary Britain (London: Routledge, 1992), chap. 3. 
33
 For Kenya and Tanzania, see Appendix 1, for UK, see: Bank of England, ‘Three Centuries of 
Macroeconomic Data, Version 2.3’, 2015 
<http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/research/Pages/onebank/threecenturies.aspx>. 
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in state employment. The same pattern is evident in France, where the 1999 census 
provides data on employment by sector. It showed that 38% of university degree 
holders worked for the state, compared to 28% of workers overall, with higher shares 
among women. 
Table 1. United Kingdom 1995: Share of economically active people in public 
employment by educational attainment (ages 30-60) (n=46,040)34 
Highest level of 
education 
Share in 
public 
employment 
ALL 
Share in public 
employment 
MEN 
Share in public 
employment 
WOMEN 
Total number 
(million) 
Degree or equivalent 41% 34% 56% 2.5 
Gigher education 50% 28% 67% 1.8 
GCE A level or equiv. 19% 15% 30% 4.1 
GCSE grade A-C or 
equiv. 26% 20% 30% 2.8 
Other qualification 22% 15% 29% 2.6 
No qualification 20% 13% 25% 3.2 
Total 27% 20% 36% 17.1 
 
Table 2. France 1999: Share of economically active people in public 
employment by educational attainment (ages 30-60) (n=882,530)35 
Highest level of 
education 
Share in public 
employment 
ALL 
Share in public 
employment 
MEN 
Share in public 
employment 
WOMEN 
Total number 
(million) 
University 38% 30% 46% 4.1 
Secondary  27% 21% 34% 8.0 
Primary 28% 25% 31% 3.3 
Less than primary 17% 14% 23% 2.2 
Total 28% 23% 35% 17.7 
 
Wage setting in the public sector also differs from that in the private sector. While most 
studies of pay find a premium for public sector workers compared to those in the 
private sector,36 this premium tends to be largest among low-skilled workers, while 
salaries are often more compressed among senior civil servants. Many studies have 
                                                          
34
 Calculated from: Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency. Central Survey Unit. Office for 
National Statistics. Social and Vital Statistics Division, ‘Quarterly Labour Force Survey, April - June, 
1995. [Data Collection]’ (UK Data Service., 1995) <http://dx.doi.org/SN: 5876>.  
35
 Calculated from: Minnesota Population Center., ‘France General Population Census 1999, 
Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, International: Version 6.3 [Machine-Readable Database].’ 
(University of Minnesota, 2016). 
36
 Robert G. Gregory and Jeff Borland, ‘Recent Developments in Public Sector Labor Markets’, in 
Handbook in Labor Economics, ed. by O. O. Ashenfelter and D. Card, 1st edn (Elsevier, 1999), pp. 
3573–3630. 
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found that institutionalised salary scales in the public sector rather than individual 
bargaining tend to reduce wage spread and thus inequality.37 
There are thus several forces to contend with. While its relatively high educational 
attainment and the possible pay premium for the lower skilled suggests that public 
sector employees will be skewed towards the top of the distribution, greater wage 
compression may limit their shares among the very top earners. This is illustrated in 
Figures 1 and 2, which give the share of public sector employees by wage decile and 
percentile for the UK in 1995, constructed based on reported hourly wage rate 
(excluding self-employed workers), using data from the labour force survey. It shows 
that public sector employees are concentrated at the top of the wage distribution, 
peaking in the 9th decile at 41% (compared to 11% in the 1st decile). At the very top of 
the distribution, however, the public sector share is smaller. On a percentile basis 
public sector employees peak in the 93rd percentile (at 52%), but constitute only 
around 17% of the 100th percentile.   
The levels are somewhat lower on a household rather than worker basis but the 
pattern is the same. In order to compare the UK results with our findings for Kenya 
and Tanzania (which are based on a household measure), Figure 1 ranks British 
households on a total household income basis using data from the 2014/15 family 
resources survey, and calculates the share of households headed by a public sector 
employees (head is defined as the household member with the highest income). The 
shares also spike in the 9th decile although the public sector shares are lower, both 
because this sample contains self-employed households, and because the high share 
of women in public employment mean that public sector employees form a lower share 
of household heads than labour force participants overall.  
While there are limits to the comparison, the UK example provides a point of reference 
to the results from East Africa. It provides a useful reminder that public sector 
employees around the world are a comparatively high earning segment of the labour 
force. This alone is not evidence of a middle class excessively beholden to the state. 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
37
 See for instance: Anthony B. Atkinson, Inequality: What Can Be Done? (Cambridge and London: 
Harvard University Press, 2015); Richard Disney and Jelena Lasusev, Pay Compression : The Role of 
Public Sector Monopsony; J. Fournier and I. Koske, The Drivers of Labour Earnings Inequality: An 
Analysis Based on Conditional and Unconditional Quantile Regressions, Less Income Inequality and 
More Growth – Are They Compatible?, OECD Economics Department Working Papers (Paris, 2012). 
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Figure 1. United Kingdom 1995: Public sector share of each wage decile 
(deciles constructed based on hourly wage), excluding self-employed workers 
(n=9,174)38 
 
Figure 2. United Kingdom 1995: Public sector share of each wage percentile 
(percentile constructed based on hourly wage), excluding self-employed 
workers (n=9,174) 
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Figure 3. United Kingdom 2014/15: Public sector-headed households as a 
share of each household income decile39 
 
Predicting the wage and employment effects on the relative standing of public 
sector employees 
Before examining where public sector employees fell in the East African income 
distributions, however, it is helpful to consider how salaries and employment in the 
public sector have performed in aggregate terms. This helps to illuminate the main 
drivers of the changing social status of members of the public service. As pay and 
employment policies in both countries have undergone profound shifts since the 
1960s, there is good reason to expect that the fortunes of public sector employees 
would have changed over the postcolonial era.  
The late colonial and postcolonial period can be broken into three phases 
characterised by different public employment policies. In the 1950s and 1960s, the 
Kenyan and Tanzanian governments sought to raise public sector salaries, particularly 
for low skilled workers, and initially limited growth in employment in order to create the 
fiscal space for wage increases. From the late 1960s until the late 1980s the 
governments reversed these priorities, limiting wage growth in order to expand the 
size of the service and incorporate more people into the public sector labour market. 
From the 1990s and on the policy was reversed once more. Recognizing that salaries 
had fallen excessively, governments sought to limit new job creation again in the 
interest of raising the salaries of those in employment.  
These shifts are illustrated in Figure 4, which traces the average (real) wage in the 
general government as a multiple of GDP per capita, against the share of the labour 
force in public employment. These charts illustrate the large oscillations in relative 
public sector wages, with a large erosion in earnings from the 1970s through 1990s 
                                                          
39
 Calculated from: National Centre for Social Research and Office for National Statistics. Social and 
Vital Statistics Division Department for Work and Pensions, ‘Family Resources Survey, 2014-2015 
[Computer File]’ (Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive, 2016) <http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-
8013-1 >. 
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as the size of the public service increased.40 From peak to trough, average earnings 
in relation to GDP per capita in Kenya fell by almost 50% and in Tanzania by roughly 
70%. Over the same time period the average educational attainment of government 
employees rose substantially, thus these charts understate the full magnitude of the 
decline in salaries. From the 1990s on, public servants in both countries saw some 
recovery in their earnings while the share of the labour force in public employment fell 
steeply. 
Figure 4. Average earnings in the government sector and the public 
employment share of the labour force (sources: see Appendix 1) 
Kenya 
 
Tanzania 
 
These wage declines of the 1970s and 1980s were driven almost entirely by inflation. 
Several of the big wage shocks coincided with the oil price shocks of the 1970s, early 
                                                          
40
 These wage declines are well documented in the policy literature, see for instance: David L. 
Lindauer, ‘Government Pay and Employment Policies and Economic Performance’, in Rehabilitating 
Government: Pay and Employment Reform in Africa, ed. by David L. Lindauer and Barbara Nunberg 
(Washington D.C.: World Bank, 1994), pp. 17–32. 
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1980s and 2000s. But although macroeconomic instability and weak budgetary control 
may have hastened the wage decile, the failure to fully compensate workers for the 
rising cost of living was in part an active policy decision. Both governments explicitly 
stated in policy documents and reports that salary growth was not a key priority; a 
Kenyan government paper from 1967 for instance, emphatically stated that  ‘creating 
more jobs for the unemployed must take precedence over increasing the incomes of 
those already employed.’41 When it came to salary adjustments moreover, those of 
lower-paid employees were raised more than those at the top, in an effort to compress 
the large wage spread within the public service inherited from the colonial era.42 
After independence both governments instituted a policy architecture for managing 
wage growth and made frequent policy pronouncements about the government’s 
preferred wage path, while successively curbing the power of labour unions.43 
Tanzania abolished unions in 1964,44 while in Kenya in 1972 the government made it 
virtually impossible for workers to strike.45 The number of man-days lost annually to 
strikes fell considerably across the region. The Tanzanian government froze public 
sector salaries between 1975 and 1980 with the explicit attempt of reducing what it 
perceived to be an urban wage premium.46 In Kenya a series of tripartite agreements 
(1964, 1970 and 1979) bound the government and private sector to increase the 
number of jobs by a set percentage in exchange for wage restraint on the part of trade 
unions, with the explicit aim of producing jobs for the unemployed.47 While the actual 
impact of these agreements has been debated (some argue that it had little real effect 
on employment),48 it is a testament to how politically important the government 
perceived employment generation to be. 
By the 1980s, however, this discourse began to change. Policy documents began to 
emphasise the unsustainable rate of employment growth rather than the state’s duty 
to the unemployed. In 1993 both Kenya and Tanzania initiated donor-supported civil 
service reform programmes. These programmes were explicitly designed to reduce 
staffing numbers in order to finance increases in salaries, which both governments 
                                                          
41
 Government of Kenya, Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1967, Proposals by the Government of Kenya for 
the Implementation of the Recommendations Contained in the Report of the Public Service Salaries 
Review Commission, 1967. 
42
 In Kenya for instance, the bottom ranks of the public service saw their base earnings rise at the 
pace of inflation, while from the top grades earnings were only to be raised by 60% of the inflation 
rate. See:  Republic of Kenya, Sessional Paper no.10 of 1980 on the Acceptance and Implementation 
of the Recommendations of the Civil Service Review Committee, 1979/80 (Nairobi, 1980).  
43
 Sabot and Knight. The Kenyan Industrial Court and the Tanzanian Permanent Labour Tribunal 
received guidelines on wage policy from the government and had the power to vet collective 
bargaining agreements. 
44
 Shivji. 
45
 Arne Bigsten, Education and Income Determination in Kenya (Hampshire and Brookfield: Gower 
Publishing Company, 1984). 
46
 Theodore Valentine, Government Wage Policy, Wage and Employment Trends, and Economic 
Instability in Tanzania since Independence, Economic Research Bureau Paper (Dar es Salaam, 
1981). 
47
 J. T. Mukui, ‘The Politics and Economics of the 1979 Tripartite Agreement in Kenya: A Note’, 
African Affairs, 82.329 (1983), 559–63. 
48
 Mukui. 
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and donors agreed had fallen too low.49 The reforms were reinforced with explicit 
creditor conditionality, with loans from the IMF and World Bank linked to civil service 
reform progress. Staff numbers were reduced through a combination of employment 
freezes, payroll cleaning and removal of inactive workers, voluntary early retirement 
schemes and redundancies. In tandem all three governments initiated programmes to 
reform the parastatal sector, with privatization programmes that with time reduced the 
number of parastatal staff. Although these programmes have been criticised for failing 
to bring about a meaningful change in staff capacity and civil service effectiveness, in 
pure numerical terms they largely achieved their objectives. The number of staff fell 
across the civil services in all three countries, which set against continued rapid 
population growth resulted in a sharp reduction in the public service share of the labour 
force. Salaries were successively increased over the course of the 1990s and 2000s, 
resulting in improvements in real earnings.  
These big policy shifts presumably had consequences for both the social standing of 
public sector employees, but their outcomes are hard to predict ex-ante, as the 
employment and pay dynamics in both eras pulled in different directions. In the 1960s 
through 1980s, the relative growth in public sector employment should have increased 
the share of public servants at the top of the income distribution while the decline in 
average salaries had the inverse effect; the net impact of these countervailing forces 
is hard to ascertain. In the 1990s, following the introduction of structural adjustment 
reforms, it is unclear how a relative wage increase influenced the position of public 
sector employees in the context of a falling number of such staff.  The coming section 
of this paper thus seeks to understand these dynamics across two distinct time 
periods: the 1960s through early 1990s, and 1990s to the present. 
A further complexity is that official salaries may be a poor guide to the actual earnings 
of public sector employees. Many have argued that African public sector households 
augmented low salaries with less transparent forms of rents, such as non-monetary 
benefits, opportunities for shirking, preferential access to goods and services, or 
outright corruption. In some of the subsequent sections we will also move beyond 
reported income, by looking at the consumption and asset wealth of public sector-
headed households which provide an alternative lens on the relative privilege or 
deprivation less sensitive to the underreporting of income. 
 
 
                                                          
49
 Petter Langseth, ‘Civil Service Reform in Uganda: Lessons Learned’, Public Administration and 
Development, 15.1 (1995), 365–90; Graham Teskey and Richard Hooper, Tanzania Civil Service 
Reform Programme: Case Study, 1999; Stephen Mworsho Lorete, The Kenya Civil Service Reform 
Programme: Analysis of the Design and Implementation of Retrenchment Policy (The Hague, 2002).  
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East Africa’s Public Sector Employees and the National Income 
Distribution 
Who constituted the income elite at independence? 
For the early independence period income tax statistics provide valuable insight into 
the incomes at the very top of the East African income distribution. This income tax 
data from the 1950s and 1960s was recently used by Tony Atkinson in a study on 
inequality in East Africa. 50 Although only around 1% or less of households were liable 
to pay income tax, by assuming that these taxpayers constituted the top 1% or 0.1% 
of all earners he could establish their shares of total income.  
These same tax records also provide information on the sources of income within this 
top elite. The tax schedules disaggregate between employees and individual tax 
payers (primarily the self-employed), and further between government and ‘other’ 
employees (Table 7). These schedules show that government employees constituted 
roughly a quarter to a third of all tax payers, and by extension of the top 1% income 
earners in Tanganyika and top 3% in Kenya. These shares are significant, but 
probably not exceptionally high compared to other regions of the world and in no case 
did public servants constitute a majority of taxpayers.51 The government share fell over 
time as highly paid European colonial officers left the countries and positions were 
Africanized. 
Table 3. Income tax payers by source of income in Kenya, Tanganyika and 
Uganda, 1959-196452 
  
1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 
KENYA             
Total tax payers         52,922          57,442          52,119          51,739          51,679           52,703  
Total tax payers  
with 'actual' income of £500 or above                 42,208  
Government employees, % of total 31% 30% 27% 28% 27% 24% 
Other employees, % of total 44% 42% 45% 45% 46% 46% 
Individual tax payers, % of total 24% 27% 28% 27% 27% 30% 
TANGANYIKA             
Total tax payers         18,099          18,797          18,069          18,803          18,873           21,036  
Total tax payers 
with 'actual' income of £500 or above                 15,769  
Government employees, % of total 32% 25% 24% 27% 24% 24% 
Other employees, % of total 40% 41% 41% 41% 41% 41% 
Individual tax payers, % of total 27% 35% 34% 33% 35% 35% 
This income elite was heavily dominated by Europeans and Asians, however, and 
therefore gives limited insight into the African income distribution, which is ultimately 
the concern of the literature on bureaucratic bourgeoisies. An alternative source from 
                                                          
50
 A B Atkinson, Top Incomes in East Africa before and after Independence, 2015. 
51
 See earlier discussion of the UK in 1995. 
52
 East African Statistical Department, East African Income Tax Department Annual Report, 1960/61 - 
1965/66 (Nairobi). 
III Working paper 10                                                                       Rebecca Simson 
 
19 
 
the same period, the annual Employment and Earnings Survey, does provide income 
distributions by racial group albeit for salaried formal sector employees only. In 
combination with the income tax data these can be used to establish the public sector 
share among high-earning Africans alone. For practical purposes, this analysis is 
limited to one year, 1964, at the dawn of the independence era. The income tax tables 
(constructed on a £/annum basis) divide individuals into income groups that use a 
different set of ranges to the employment survey (which is constructed on a 
Shs./month basis). To avoid making assumptions about the income distribution within 
bins, I simply compare Africans earning above £600 with taxpayers reporting income 
above £500 (this simplification has only a minor impact on the results).  
Around the time of independence, Africans constituted 15% of these tax-paying, 
salaried high income earners in Kenya and 21% in Tanganyika. They were therefore 
a much smaller share of all African households, constituting roughly the top 0.3% of 
households in Kenya and 0.1% in Tanganyika. Importantly, however, among Africans 
alone, public sector employees significantly out-number private sector employees, in 
contrast to Europeans and Asians where the reverse was true.  
We have no way of estimating the African share of self-employed tax payers, however, 
and can only set very rough upper and lower bounds. The literature on Africanisation 
suggests that the public sector led the way in Africanizing senior positions, while firms 
indigenized in the late 1960s with the introduction of rules on firm ownership, board 
memberships and such.53 It thus seems reasonable to assume that the African share 
of high-earning self-employed taxpayers would be lower than their share of high 
earning employees.54 I therefore estimate a lower bound scenario, assuming that there 
were no African self-employed (i.e. individual) taxpayers earning above £500, and an 
upper bound where the African individual taxpayer share was the same as their share 
of employee taxpayers.  
On the basis of these assumptions, African public sector employees constituted 
between 50-75% of this income elite, which in turn constituted the top 0.1-0.3% of all 
households. This gives some quantitative support for the notion of a bureaucratic 
bourgeoisie – the very top of the African income distribution the public service was 
indeed dominant. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
53
 Donald Rothchild, ‘Kenya’s Africanization Program: Priorities of Development and Equity’, The 
American Political Science Review, 64.3 (1970), 737–53. 
54
 In agriculture the situation may be different, but individual taxpayers were concentrated in the trade 
and services sectors rather than agriculture, which suggests that wealthy farmers were a relatively 
small share of the income elite. 
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Table 4. African share of taxpayers and by source of income, Kenya and 
Tanganyika, 1964 
 Kenya Tanganyika 
Total employees with 'actual' income above £500 30,487  10,824  
African* employees with salary above £600 4,600  2,246  
o/w public sector 3,500  1,717  
o/w private sector 1,100  529  
Total individual taxpayers with 'actual' income above 
£500 11,721  4,945  
African individual taxpayers - lower bound 0 0 
African individual taxpayers - upper bound 1,769  1,026  
Public sector % of earners >£600 - UPPER BOUND 76% 76% 
Public sector % of earners >£600 - LOWER BOUND 55% 52% 
African high income earners as % of total households 0.3% 0.1% 
African high income earners as % of all high income 
earners 
15% 21% 
* for Tanganyika this covers men only. 
Since independence these shares appear to have fallen. Using the sporadic data from 
the Earning and Employment Survey on the wage distribution, Figure 5 calculates the 
public sector share of the top 10% of formal employees (which corresponds roughly 
to the top 1-2% of income earners overall). This shows that the public sector share 
rose briefly in the late 1960s as many Europeans and Asians, who dominated the high 
income private sector ranks, left East Africa. Starting in the early-mid 1970s however, 
the public sector share of high income earning employees began to fall. While this 
exercise only captures the relative ratios among formal sector employees, it seems 
very likely that the number of wealthy African business and farm-owners also rose in 
proportion to public sector employees, given the indiginization policies of the 1970s.  
Figure 5. Public sector share of top 10% of formal sector employees, Kenya 
and Tanzania (sources and method: see Appendix 3) 
 
These top slivers of the income distribution constitute a tiny proportion of the 
population, however, and a very small share of public sector employees overall. 
Perhaps of even greater political significance is the degree to which the broader, 
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
19
63
19
65
19
67
19
69
19
71
19
73
19
75
19
77
19
79
19
81
19
83
19
85
19
87
19
89
19
91
19
93
19
95
19
97
19
99
20
01
20
03
20
05
20
07
20
09
20
11
20
13Pu
bl
ic
 
se
ct
or
 s
ha
re
 o
f t
op
 
10
%
 
o
f 
fo
rm
al
 in
cm
e 
ea
rn
er
s
Kenya
Tanzania
III Working paper 10                                                                       Rebecca Simson 
 
21 
 
nascent middle class was dominated by public servants at independence. In the 
following analysis I therefore estimate the public sector-headed household share 
within the top income or consumption decile and percentile, using data from household 
budget surveys.  
Establishing public sector position within the national income distribution: 
Method and data 
Household budget surveys provide a valuable source of information about social 
stratification. The following analysis draws on household surveys from Kenya from 
1975, 1994 and 2005/06 and Tanzania from 1969, 1993, 2000/01 and 2011/12. All the 
surveys from the 1990s and 2000s are available in microdata form and households 
headed by public servants can be identified within the sample. In these surveys 
households are ranked on the basis of consumption per adult household member 
rather than income, as consumption is regarded as a superior measure of living 
standards in low-income contexts.55 This has the further advantage that it captures the 
‘output’ of all household income, and is thus less sensitive to potential underreporting 
of informal earnings and benefits. I choose to normalize household consumption by 
adult household members (15 and above) rather than per capita or using an adult 
equivalency scale as the focus of this paper is on the ability of different types of 
households to generate income rather than living standards per se. Further discussion 
on the construction of variables and various sensitivity tests to gauge possible biases 
in the data are discussed in Appendices 4 and 5. 
Table 5. Description of surveys used in analysis (further details given in 
Appendix 4 and 5) 
 Source Abbreviation Data 
access 
Sample size  
(# 
households) 
Likely 
direction of 
bias 
Kenya      
1974/75 Integrated Rural Survey 
(in addition to other 
sources) 
IRS Published 
tables 
IRS: 2,300 Under-estimate 
1994 Welfare monitoring 
survey, second round 
WMS Microdata  11,000 Over-estimate 
2005/06 Integrated household 
budget survey 
KIHBS Microdata  13,000 Small under-
estimate 
Tanzania      
1969 Household budget 
survey 
HBS Published 
tables 
2,800 Under-estimate 
1993 Human Resource 
Development Survey 
HRDS Microdata  5,000 Over-estimate 
2000/01 Household budget 
survey 
HBS Microdata  22,000 - 
2011/12 Household budget 
survey 
HBS Microdata  10,000  - 
 
                                                          
55
 See discussion by: James Galbraith, Inequality and Instability: A Study of the World Economy Just 
before the Great Crisis (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
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The weaker part of this analysis however, are the results from the 1960s and 1970s, 
which are derived from printed tables that tabulate the number of households by 
household income groups. The Kenyan 1975 analysis moreover, combines several 
sources, including the integrated rural survey (which covered roughly 75% of the 
population), the large farm survey, enumeration of employees, informal sector survey, 
income tax statistics report and estimates of the pastoral population produced by 
Collier and Lal (1980), in order to arrive at a national income distribution (see Appendix 
4.1). 
As these printed tables do not disaggregate the distribution on the basis of sector of 
employment, I estimate the public sector share by comparing the national distribution 
with data on the wage distribution in the public sector from the EES. The EES data on 
the public sector wage distribution, however, is presented on an individual worker 
basis rather than a household basis. I therefore remove women from the distribution 
and make the assumption that each male public sector employee is the head of a 
household and his public sector earnings is the household’s only source of income.  
This last assumption is particularly problematic as other surveys from the same period 
show that many public sector households had more than one source of income. In 
Kenya in particular, the government relaxed the colonial-era rules on ownership of 
firms and property by civil servants in 1971.56 It was argued that public servants were 
well placed to raise the capital and possess the business knowledge necessary to 
replace foreign business owners, and thereby aid the pace of Africanisation of the 
private sector – a major political priority of the era. By the mid-1970 critics were already 
complaining that this reform created a conflict of interest, as civil servants now served 
‘two masters’,57 and by 1980 another public service commission concluded that many 
civil servants had multiple income sources.58 In Tanzania in contrast the 1967 Arusha 
Declaration included a leadership code that prevented senior and mid-level civil 
servants from owning companies, real estate or holding more than one salary, but 
these rules were limited to relatively senior positions and did not prevent land 
ownership or other household members from working.  It is therefore likely that the 
Tanzanian 1969 and Kenyan 1975 results are lower-bound estimates. 
Adding a further downward bias, moreover, is the inclusion of Europeans and Asians 
in the top income brackets. This has only a marginal impact on the public sector shares 
of the top decile, as non-Africans were a small share of the overall population. The 
public sector share of the top 1% however, would be lower if limited to Africans alone 
as the European and Asian minorities held a disproportionate share of senior private 
sector roles. This effect will be strongest in the earlier periods when the European and 
                                                          
56
 On the basis of the recommendations of the Ndegwa Commission on the Public Service Structure 
and Remuneration, see: D. N. Ndegwa, Report of the Commission of Inquiry: Public Service Structure 
and Remuneration Commission 1970-71 (Nairobi, 1971). 
57
 H. J. Nyamu, The State of the Civil Service Today: A Critical Appraisal (Nairobi, 1974).  
58
 S. N. Waruhiu, Report of the Civil Service Review Committee 1979/80 (Nairobi, 1980). 
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Asian population shares were higher, compounding the likely underestimation of the 
1975 and 1969 public sector share estimates. 
Kenyan results 
Even with a likely underestimation of the 1975 measures however, the Kenyan results 
show a significant decline in the share of high earning households headed by public 
sector employees. The position of Kenyan public sector-headed households within the 
full income distribution are given in Figure 6, where the percentage of public sector-
headed households is calculated by income or consumption decile.59 In the top decile, 
public sector-headed households fell from 36% in 1975 to 30% in 1994 and 17% in 
2005/06. By the 2000s then, the Kenyan public sector-headed household share of the 
top consumption decile was lower than in the United Kingdom. These results suggest 
that it was the falling size of Kenya’s public service since structural adjustment rather 
than changes in relative pay that accounted for the main decline in the public sector 
top income shares, although, as discussed above, the 1975 measure is most likely an 
under-estimate. 
The public sector-headed household distribution also grew more progressive over 
time; while 32% of public sector-headed households were found in the top decile in 
1975, in 1994 the share was only 22%; it then rose again to 26% in 2005/06 as the 
public sector pay scale was decompressed. In both 1994 and 2005/06 roughly half of 
all public sector-headed households were in bottom three-quarters of the consumption 
distribution, which can hardly be considered an especially privileged social strata.  
Figure 6. Kenya: public sector-headed households as percentage of 
consumption decile, 1994 and 2005/06, normalized by number of adults in 
household 
1975 1994 2005/06 
  
                                                          
59
 Note that the data for 1975 is a rough recalculation as it builds on underlying wage group data 
divided into six rather than ten bins. I simply assume a linear distribution of incomes within each wage 
group, resulting in a flat distribution across deciles 1-3 and 4-6. 
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Table 10 examines the composition of the top 10% and top 1%, disaggregated by the 
economic sector of the household head. These decompositions based on economic 
sector are rough estimates as some of the categories are difficult to distinguish in 
certain of the surveys, in particular the division between private sector employees and 
informal sector workers. Furthermore the growing share of retirees, homemakers and 
students in the top income shares may be distorting the picture as some retirees are 
presumably former public sector employees, while some students may be supported 
by their public sector-employed parents. However, assuming that these inactive 
households are in fact supported by sectoral earnings that match the broader 
composition of earnings in the income bracket as a whole would at most raise the 
public sector shares by 1-2%. 
With these qualifiers, the data confirms that while the public sector share of the top 
decile fell, the share of high earning households in the private sector increased, in 
particular those headed by self-employed business owners, many of whom operated 
businesses in the informal sector. Agricultural-based households in contrast, fell 
significantly in share of the top decile. 
At the very top of the distribution, among the top 1% instead of the top 10%, this pattern 
of change was even starker. While there is no obvious change in the public sector 
share of the top 1% between 1975 and 1994, the share then fell from 31% to 13% 
between 1994 and 2005/06. The formal private sector share, meanwhile, dropped 
between 1975 and 1994 and then almost doubled again between 1994 and 2005/06. 
These formal private sector employees were primarily managers or professionals in 
the service sector, including a considerable share in the financial sector. A large share 
of wealthy households were also found in the ‘other’ category, which comprised 
retirees and other unclassifiable households. Agricultural households also fell as a 
share of the top 1%. 
Table 6. Kenya: composition of the top income/consumption decile and 
percentile, by economic sector of the household head60  
 
Top 10% Top 1% 
Household head sector of 
employment 1975 1994 2005/06 1975 1994 2005/06 
Public 36% 30% 17% 30% 31% 13% 
Private employment* 23% 27% 33% 47% 18% 32% 
Own business / enterprise 9% 23% 26% }23% 42% 31% 
Agriculture 32% 19% 12% 9% 5% 
Other (retirees, students etc.)  1% 12%   19% 
*Not necessarily in ‘formal’ sector; all who report themselves as employees. 
                                                          
60
 Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, Integrated Household Budget Survey 2005/06 (Nairobi); Kenya 
National Bureau of Statistics, Welfare Monitoring Survey 1994, Second Round (Nairobi). 1975 
distribution constructed from the integrated rural survey, annual enumeration of employees, and the 
income tax annual report; published in: Kenya Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract 1980 
(Nairobi); I. Livingstone, Rural Development Employment and Incomes in Kenya
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As an alternative to consumption-based measures of socioeconomic standing, it is 
also possible to use asset ownership and housing characteristics instead of 
consumption per adult to stratify the population. A potential weakness of consumption 
based measures of stratifying the population is that it is sensitive to price differences 
across the country, as well as survey quality and sampling issues (discussed further 
in Appendix 4). Although less granular than consumption, asset-based measures of 
living standards therefore have several advantages. Firstly, they are easier to measure 
accurately. Asking a household member if they own a car or refrigerator gives a result 
less prone to error than computations of their full consumption patterns over a month 
or year. Secondly, they are less sensitive to differences in price level across a country 
(rural-urban), and may say more about actual social status than consumption, 
particularly where consumption measures are strongly shaped by own-production of 
food. Lastly, in the Kenyan case, it allows us to make use of the 2009 census, which 
contained questions about asset ownership but not about income or consumption. The 
census provides a much larger sample of households and a detailed breakdown of the 
labour force by sector of work. This is particularly useful for understanding 
differentiation at the very top of the distribution, for which the relatively small 1994 and 
2005/06 samples are less well suited. 61  One drawback of asset and housing quality 
measures however, is that they react with a lag to changes in income. Households 
who have already made investments may be able to retain a house with piped water 
or tiled floors, even if their income falls. 
With these caveats in mind I construct an asset index comprising items or housing 
characteristics that signify a high standard of living, such as ownership of a car, 
computer, refrigerator, modern stove, TV, and living in a home with electricity, flush 
toilet, piped water and modern flooring (cement or tiles). For Kenya in 1994 this index 
relies only on household characteristics – electricity, piped water, flush toilet, flooring 
and wall materials, as well as cooking fuel/method - as the survey questionnaire did 
not include questions on asset ownership. Note that roughly half or more of all Kenyan 
households have none of these characteristics. While this index is a useful way of 
measuring differences at the top of the distribution, it is unhelpful for distinguishing the 
poor from the slightly better off. I therefore use this measure solely to examine the 
composition of the top 10% and 1%. 
I construct both a ‘naïve’ index, which simply sums the number of wealth 
characteristics that each household has, as well as using a factor analysis technique 
following Sahn and Stifel and Ncube and Shimles.62 This technique estimates weights 
for these different assets/characteristics using factor analysis, which allows the data 
itself to determine the relative importance of each asset in contributing to some 
unspecified underlying factor (presumed to be wealth in this case). The two alternative 
                                                          
61
 Anthony B. Atkinson. 
62
 David Sahn and David Stifel, ‘Poverty Comparisons over Time and across Countries in Africa’, 
World Development, 28.12 (2000), 2123–55; Mthuli Ncube and Abebe Shimeles, ‘The Making of 
Middle Class in Africa : Evidence from DHS Data’, The Journal of Development Studies, 51.2 (2015), 
178–93. 
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index construction methods give very similar results (correlations of between 0.97 and 
0.99), and following the more recent literature I choose to report findings using the 
factor analysis technique. The index is then divided into deciles and percentiles to give 
a relative wealth measure. Only the 2009 percentile measures are reported, as the 
results for 1994 and 2005/06 showed considerable volatility in the top percentiles 
suggesting that the samples are too small and the indicator insufficiently granular to 
capture differences at the very top of the distribution. In the table below we replicate 
the disaggregation from Table 6 using asset wealth rather than consumption per adult 
to identify the top 10% and top 1% of households.  
Public sector-headed household and private employee-headed households are a 
higher share of the top decile when measured on an asset wealth rather than 
consumption basis, while the share of self-employed stays roughly the same. The 
share of agricultural households in contrast, is considerably smaller. This may reflect 
the fact that consumption measures are sensitive to the pricing of consumption of own-
produced food, and may be inflating the observed consumption levels in agricultural 
households through the pricing of own-production (this technique assumes that this 
food could be sold and converted into other forms of household spending, which may 
not be the case). Some of the asset or housing characteristic measures may also 
partial to urban households. A rural, agrarian household is presumably less likely to 
have piped water, flush toilets or be connected to an electricity grid than an urban 
dweller with the same level of income. 
While this alternative method of stratifying the population suggests a slower rate of 
change than the consumption method, it does not alter the overall trajectory. While the 
public sector share of the elite remained relatively steady between 1975 and 1994 
(assuming that the 1975 income-based measure is an accurate reflection of asset 
wealth), it then dropped considerably to 21% in 2005/06 and 18% in 2009. The 2009 
census results, which are based on a considerably larger sample (10% of the 
population) add further confidence to these findings, showing a continued fall in the 
public sector share of the top decile and percentile. 
Table 7. Kenya: composition of the top asset wealth decile and percentile, by 
economic sector of the household head (1975 measure based on income, see 
Table 2) 
 
Top 10% Top 1% 
Household head sector of 
employment 1975 1994 2005/06 2009 1975 1994 2005/06 2009 
Public 36% 36% 21% 18% 30%   19% 
Private employment* 23% 38% 36% 36% 47%   44% 
Own business / enterprise 9% 22% 26% 33% }23%   30% 
Agriculture 32% 3% 4% 2%   0.5% 
Other (retirees, students etc.)  1% 13% 10%    7% 
*Not necessarily in ‘formal’ sector; all who report themselves as employees. 
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Given the significant relative decline in public sector salaries in the 1990s, it is perhaps 
surprising that the decline in the public sector share of the top decile was not larger 
between 1975 and 1994. In 1994 the Kenyan economy had been performing poorly 
for several years with inflation in double digits and formal sector wages were at their 
nadir.63 Part of the answer to the relative resilience of public sector-headed 
households appears to lie in income diversification. As already mentioned, public 
sector headed households often had more than one source of income. 64 While the 
earlier surveys provided only indirect evidence of this, the surveys from the 1990s and 
2000s allow us to quantify the effects of secondary income sources. In 1994 the 
median public sector-headed household earned 57% of household income from its 
public sector salary and the other 43% from farming, business profits or the salaries 
of other household members.65 Although the 2005/06 income data is less reliable, it 
appears that these levels rose again as salaries recovered (and agricultural prices 
slumped) in the mid-2000s. In 2005/06 the median public sector-headed household 
earned 80% from the household head’s primary salary and 20% from other sources.66 
Table 8 examines these secondary income sources. It measures the share of public 
sector-headed households that report additional incomes by income stream. As a 
control group, these shares are also reported for households headed by a private 
(formal) sector employee. Close to 60% of public sector headed households in 1994 
had either a business or farm that generated income beyond their salaries or wages, 
and 49% had at least one additional wage income earner. These shares were higher 
among public sector-headed households than among private sector-headed 
households, although this may partially be an artefact of more urban-based 
households in the private sector, which limited agricultural opportunities. Either way, it 
appears that formal sector households were able to augment their salaries by 
straddling different economic sectors, including employment, farming and business.  
In 2005/06 the share of households with a farm or enterprise income had fallen to just 
below 50% among public sector-headed households and 24% among private sector-
headed households (although the formal private sector measure may not be perfectly 
consistent across surveys). The share of households with a second salary or wage 
earner had also fallen quite considerably. While not conclusive evidence as we have 
no data points for the pre-crisis era, the higher reliance on secondary income sources 
in the 1990s compared to the 2000s is consistent with the idea that households 
diversified incomes in response to the economic crisis of the 1980s and 1990s, and 
concentrated their efforts once more once salaries began to recover. 
                                                          
63
 International Monetary Fund, Kenya: Recent Economic Developments (Washington D.C., 1995). 
64
 Also discussed by: Waruhiu; Mwangi wa Githinji, Ten Millionaries and Ten Million Beggars: A Study 
of Income Distribution and Development in Kenya (Hampshire and Burlington: Ashgate Publishing 
Limited, 2000); Neubert. 
65
 Author’s calculations based on WMS 1994. 
66
 Author’s calculations based on KIHBS 2005/06. However, the agricultural and business income 
data appears to be underreported. 
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Table 8. Kenya: Percentage of public and private sector-headed households 
who have secondary incomes, by source (calculated from 1994 WMS and 
2005/06 KIHBS) 
 1994 2005/06 
Sources of secondary income Public Private  Public Private  
Operate business 31% 27% 19% 13% 
Agriculture or livestock income 40% 28% 39% 17% 
Spouse/other family member in employment 49% 45% 32% 25% 
Have either business, farm or livestock that is earning 
income 58% 46% 49% 24% 
 
Tanzanian results 
The Tanzanian results tell a similar story of change to that of Kenya. Figure 6 shows 
where public sector employees fell within the entire Tanzanian income or consumption 
distribution in each year.67 Because of its large parastatal sector, public employment 
has been broken down into a general government and parastatal employment in these 
charts. The results show that public sector-headed households fell from roughly a 
quarter of the top decile in 1969 to 16% in 2011/12. As in the Kenyan case, most of 
the reduction took place after structural adjustment, when the number of public sector 
jobs fell. In the 2000s in particular, the government’s divestures from the comparatively 
high-paying parastatal sector explain most of the reduction.  
The broader distribution of public sector-headed households also shows considerable 
change. In 1969 nearly all public sector-headed households had incomes that put 
them in the top two deciles of income earners. By 1993 however, the size of the public 
sector had grown, and although public servants remained roughly a quarter of the top 
decile, they constituted a relatively large share of households at the middle of the 
income distribution. Government and parastatal employees differ in this regard 
however, with parastatal-headed households concentrated towards the top of the 
distribution suggesting that the parastatal sector had protected its workers better 
throughout the two decades of wage erosion.68 By the 2000s Tanzanian public sector 
salaries had increased significantly and by the end of the decade were close to their 
1960s level, while the level of employment had fallen as the government instituted 
hiring freezes and divested from the parastatal sector. Public sector-headed 
households became more concentrated at the top of the distribution once more.  
 
 
                                                          
67
 Note that the 1969 distribution is estimated on the basis of five uneven income brackets, and we 
therefore simply assume an even distribution across the bottom 7 deciles. 
68
 Other support for this argument, see: David L Lindauer and Richard H Sabot, ‘The Public/private 
Wage Differential in a Poor Urban Economy’, Journal of Development Economics, 12 (1983), 137. 
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Figure 7. Tanzania: Share of public sector headed households by 
income/consumption decile, normalized by adults in household* (Sources: see 
Appendix 5.) 
1969 1993 
 
 
 
2000/01 2011/12 
  
Table 9 examine the composition of the top 10% and 1% on the basis of the household 
head’s stated sector of work.69 As the public sector share of the top decile fell over the 
1990s and 2000s the private sector appears to have gained in size, both among 
                                                          
69
 As in the Kenyan case, these categories are quite roughly defined and various judgement calls had 
to be made in order to harmonize categories across surveys. 
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employees and business-owners. As in Kenya, agricultural households fell in share, 
at least over the course of the 2000s. 
In the top 1%, as opposed to the top 10%, public sector-headed households were a 
larger share throughout the period, but fell from roughly 42% in 1969 to 21% in 2001, 
before recovering marginally to 25% in 2011/12, presumably on account of rising 
public sector salaries. Business owners constitute the largest and most rapidly growing 
share of the top 1%, while agriculturalists fell in share. Private formal sector employee 
households remained a relatively steady 20% of the to 1% throughout the postcolonial 
era. 
Table 9. Tanzania: composition of the top income/consumption decile and 
percentile, by economic sector of the household head 70 
 
Top 10% Top 1% 
Main activity of household 
head 1969 1993 2001 2011/12 1969 1993 2001 2011/12 
Public 25% 24% 17% 14% 42% 36% 21% 25% 
    Government 18% 17% 13% 12% 28% 21% 8% 16% 
    Parastatal 7% 7% 5% 2% 14% 15% 13% 9% 
Private employment* 14% 13% 19% 27% 24% 21% 20% 22% 
Informal sector / business 
}61% 
30% 24% 36% 
}34% 
30% 35% 42% 
Agriculture (or fishing) 30% 33% 21% 13% 19% 9% 
Other (retirees, students 
etc.) 3% 5% 3%  4% 3% 
 
Using the same methods as in the Kenyan analysis, asset ownership and housing 
characteristics are used as an alternative means of ranking households (results 
reported in Table 10). Using an asset index rather than household consumption to 
stratify households raises the share of public sector-headed households in both the 
top 10% and top 1%, but does not alter the basic story of change. Between 1993 and 
2011/12 the public sector share of the top decile fell considerably, while the share of 
the top 1% shows a more modest reduction. As in Kenya, stratifying households by 
asset wealth significantly reduces the number of agricultural households in the top 
strata. 
 
 
 
                                                          
70
 Tanzania National Bureau of Statistics. 1969 Household Budget Survey, Volume 1 (Dar es Salaam, 
1972); Tanzania Bureau of Statistics, Survey of Employment and Earnings 1969 (Dar es Salaam, 
1969); University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania Human Resource Development Survey 1993 (Dar es 
Salaam); Tanzania National Bureau of Statistics, Household Budget Survey 2000/01 & Household 
Budget Survey 2011/12, (Dar es Salaam). 
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Table 10. Tanzania: composition of the top asset wealth decile and percentile, 
by economic sector of the household head 71 
 
Top 10% Top 1% 
Main activity of household 
head 1969 1993 2001 2011/12 1969 1993 2001 2011/12 
Public 25% 31% 19% 19% 42%   37% 
    Government 18% 20% 12% 16% 28%   26% 
    Parastatal 7% 11% 7% 3% 14%   11% 
Private employment* 14% 18% 28% 25% 24%   22% 
Informal sector / business 
}61% 
32% 33% 43% 
}34% 
  34% 
Agriculture (or fishing) 13% 13% 6%   2% 
Other (retirees, students 
etc.) 6% 7% 7%   6% 
 
As in Kenya, the formal sector income declines in Tanzania during the 1970s through 
early 1990s were partially off-set by household diversification of incomes. In 1993 the 
vast majority (67%) of Tanzanian public sector-headed households also had some 
income or own-production of food from farming, livestock or fishing. Very few, 
however, reported income from a business. Secondary income sources remained 
important in the 2000s, although the share with agricultural incomes dropped 
significantly. In 2000/01 roughly 53% of public sector-headed households had 
additional income from farming or business activities and 27% had a spouse or child 
in paid employment. Somewhat unexpectedly the share of public sector-headed 
households with secondary incomes rose modestly between 2000/01 and 2011/12 
despite the continued recovery in public sector earnings. This may be a result of the 
falling share of parastatal employees in public employment, who were less likely to 
own farms than their general government counterparts. Unlike in Kenya though, there 
is no clear evidence that public sector household concentrated their efforts once 
earnings began to recover. 
Table 11. Tanzania: Public and private sector-headed household shares with 
secondary incomes, by income source, 2000/01 and 2011/12 (Sources: 2000/01 
and 2011/12 HBS, see Appendix 5.) 
 Additional income source beyond 
primary employment earnings 
1993 2000/01 2011/12 
Public Private Public Private Public Private 
Business/self-employment income 4% 4% 26% 33% 26% 22% 
Agricultural or fishing income 67% 52% 39% 24% 44% 20% 
Spouse/other family member has 
employment income N/A N/A 27% 23% 27% 22% 
Have either business or farm that is 
generating income 69% 55% 53% 46% 58% 38% 
                                                          
71
 University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania Human Resource Development Survey 1993 (Dar es 
Salaam); Tanzania National Bureau of Statistics, Household Budget Survey 2000/01 & Household 
Budget Survey 2011/12, (Dar es Salaam). 
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The regional distribution of public sector employment  
In both Kenya and Tanzania the wealthy strata of society are concentrated in the urban 
areas, and particularly in the capital cities. The data suggests that 66% of the Kenyan 
top 1% of households (based on asset wealth) live in Nairobi (and another 7% in 
Mombasa) in 2009 and 59% of the Tanzanian top 1% in Dar es Salaam (2011/12). 
The declining public sector share in the top percentile is thus largely a function of more 
comparatively wealthy private sector-headed households in the capital cities. This 
begs a further question – does the declining share of public sector employment have 
a distinct geographic pattern? Does the public sector’s relative importance differ in 
rural versus urban areas? To address this question it is first necessary to examine 
how public sector jobs are distributed geographically, and how this distribution 
changed over time.  
The colonial era left postcolonial states with a geographically skewed pattern of public 
spending, particularly so is in settler colonies such as Kenya. European and Asian 
state and private sector employees were disproportionately based in Nairobi, 
Mombasa and Dar es Salaam. In Kenya in 1956, 56% of all formal sector salaries and 
wages were earned in Nairobi or Mombasa.72 In 1972 (the first year for which 
sectorally disaggregated data is available), 23% of all public sector employees were 
found in Nairobi although the city was home to 5% of the Kenyan population.73 In 
Tanzania in 1965, 19% of public servants were based in Dar es Salaam which was 
home to only 3% of the population. Even outside the main cities, colonial government 
spending had been influenced by the uneven penetration of missionaries and an 
uneven distribution of colonial investments, which skewed the distribution of the public 
sector jobs.74  
Since the colonial period therefore, as rural-urban migration increased and social 
services were expanded across each respective country, public employment has in 
fact grown more equitable. The geographic inequality in public sector employment can 
be measured by calculating the number of public sector employees per capita by 
district or region and examining the coefficient of variation across them. For Kenya a 
geographic breakdown of formal sector employment by Kenya’s 32 districts is 
available from 1972, although a disaggregation by sector (public/private) and district 
is only available for a smaller subset of years. The data from the employment and 
earnings surveys is complemented with data from the 1994 household survey and 
                                                          
72
 42% of total formal earnings accrued to employees in Nairobi and 14% in Mombasa. Statistical 
abstract 1956. 
73
 Earliest year for which data is available. Kenya Statistical Abstract 1972. 
74
 There is a large literature on the economic geography of colonialism, for instance that by Nathan 
Nunn on the links between missionary penetration and schooling Nathan Nunn, ‘Religious Conversion 
in Colonial Africa’, American Economic Review, 100.2 (2010), 147–52; Nathan Nunn, ‘Gender and 
Missionary Influence in Colonial Africa’, Africa`s Development in Historical Perspective, 2014, 489–
512. 
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2009 census. For Tanzania, data for the private and government sector75 is available 
from the Employment and Earnings Surveys between 1965-1980, and from the 1993, 
2000/01 and 2011/12 household surveys, broken down by mainland Tanzania’s 20 
regions. Note that district and region boundaries have undergone some changes; the 
method for harmonizing geographic areas is outlined in Appendix 2. 
As shown in Figure 9, public employment became more equitably distributed 
geographically over time in both countries. In Kenya the coefficient of variation of 
public employment density across districts fell from close to 1 to 0.4 between 1972 
and 1994 and in Tanzania from 1.1 to 0.4 (albeit with some fluctuations that may reflect 
data quality problems). This dynamic was heavily influenced by the declining 
exceptionalism of Nairobi and Mombasa in Kenya, and Dar es Salaam in Tanzania. 
As Table 15 shows, as public employment grew, public employment growth was more 
rapid outside the capital city than inside it, reflected in the falling share of public sector 
employees resident in the capital. Another important factor was the rapid migration 
into the capital cities (see rising population share), which raised the share of the 
population served by the capital cities public sector employees. 
As a result the public employment share of the labour force fell in both capital cities. A 
rough estimate of the share of Nairobi households headed by a public sector employee 
suggests a fall from roughly 35-40% in the 1970s,76 to 23% by 1994, and 8% by 
2009.77 In Dar es Salaam the public sector share fell from roughly 20% in 1970 to 13% 
in 2000/01.78 The fall in public sector-headed households in the urban areas was also 
accentuated by a growing share of women in public employment, who are more likely 
to be classified as the spouse rather than head of the household. In Nairobi for 
instance, the share of public sector employees who were the heads of their household 
fell from 77% to 62% between 1992 and 2009.79 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
75
 The early surveys count parastatal employment (excl. EAC parastatals) as part of the ‘enterprise’ 
sector. The government sector denotes the central and local government and former EAC functions. 
76
 Calculated from EES data, assuming a household size of 4.  
77
 1994 WMS and 2009 housing and population census 
78
 1970 estimate based on EES, 2000/01 Household Budget Survey. 
79
 1992 WMS and 2009 housing and population census 
III Working paper 10                                                                       Rebecca Simson 
 
34 
 
Figure 8. Coefficient of variation – public/government employment to 
population ratio, by district/region (see Appendix 2 for method and sources) 
Kenya  
(32 districts) 
Tanzania  
(20 regions) 
   
Table 12. Share of public sector employees resident in the capital cities 
(closest year available to benchmarks) 
  
c.1970 c.1980 c.1990 c.2000 
Nairobi (Kenya) Population share 5% 6% 7% 8% 
Public 
employment  
share 23% 24% 15% 17% 
Dar es Salaam 
(Tanzania) 
Population share 4% 5% 7% 7% 
Government emp 
share 18% 16% 10% 13% 
Sources: Kenya 1972 and 1982 Statistical Abstracts, 1994 WMS and 2009 Housing and Population 
Census; Tanzania 1970 and 1980 Enumeration of Employees Surveys, 1993 HRDS and 2000/01 
HBS (note government rather than public sector share in the Tanzanian case). 
Given the declining importance of public sector employment in the capital cities relative 
to the more peripheral parts of the country, has the declining public sector elite share 
varied by locality? Using the asset wealth index (as it allows us to make use of the 
Kenyan 2009 census), the tables below calculate the public sector share of the top 
wealth decile for rural and urban areas separately, and the capital city alone. Note that 
these results will not tally with the earlier decile shares, as the decile thresholds will 
vary across these localities (the cut-off into the top decile among residents in the 
capital cities is far higher than in the rural areas).  
The Kenyan results suggest a steeper decline in the public sector shares in the capital 
city, from roughly 40% in 1994 to 17% in 2009, compared to a fall from 26% to 15% in 
the rural areas, and 41% to 20% in the urban areas in total. The Tanzanian trends are 
more ambiguous, and the 1993 results should be treated with caution given the small 
samples, but suggest extremely high public sector employment levels in Dar es 
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Salaam’s highest wealth bracket in 1993 – 57% - and a sizeable fall since. The decline 
in the urban areas excluding Dar es Salaam however, was lower than in the rural 
areas.  
This disaggregation sheds further light on the reconfiguration of East Africa’s elites. 
Within the capital cities public servants were a larger share of the middle and upper 
strata in the first decades of independence than in the country at large. In these 
localities the public sector share of the top decile has declined more rapidly than in the 
smaller towns and rural areas. In the capital cities then, if less so in the more peripheral 
parts of each country, the ‘middle class’ reliance on public employment has fallen very 
markedly.  
Table 13. Kenya: public sector share of the top decile by asset wealth, by 
urban/rural locality 
 Rural Urban Nairobi 
 1994 2009 1994 2009 1994 2009 
Public sector share of 
top decile (asset wealth) 26% 15% 41% 20% 40% 17% 
Percentage decline 42% 51% 58% 
Sources: Calculated from the Kenya 1994 WMS and 2009 Housing and population census 
Table 14. Tanzania: public sector share of the top decile by asset wealth, by 
urban/rural locality 
 Rural Urban Dar es Salaam 
 1993 2000 2011/1
2 
1993 2000 2011/12 1993 2000 2011/1
2 
Public sector share 
of top decile (asset 
wealth) 19% 16% 12% 37% 39% 30% 57% 40% 33% 
Percentage decline 
(1993-2011) 36% 19% 42% 
Sources: Calculated from Tanzania 1993 HRDS and 2000 and 2011/12 Household Budget Surveys 
 
Conclusion 
Many scholars of African postcolonial history have ascribed an important political and 
economic role to African public sector employees. Whether they are thought to be 
rentiers or political clients, public sector employees are associated with undue 
privilege, and their disproportionate share of Africa’s middle and upper classes is 
thought to have had negative economic and political consequences for the continent. 
An analysis of the income tax records from the early 1960s and available household 
survey data from the 1960s and 1970s from Kenya and Tanzania shows that among 
Africans public servants were indeed a large share of top income earners. Among the 
top 0.1% - to 0.5% they comprised between a half and three-quarters of all income 
earners. Within the broader distribution their shares were lower but still significant, 
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comprising roughly a quarter of households in the top decile in Tanzania in 1969 and 
just over a third in Kenya (1975).  
But the fate of public sector employees in the decades following independence reveals 
a more complicated story. Public sector employees saw a steep decline in real wages 
between the 1970s and early 1990s despite their rapidly increasing educational 
attainment. In Kenya and Tanzania average real earnings in the public sector declined 
by 70-80% between the 1970s and early 1990s, falling from 6 times GDP per capita 
to just above 3 times in Kenya, and from 7 times GDP per capita to 2 times in Tanzania. 
Starting in the 1990s in moreover, both governments rationalised their public services 
which significantly reduced the share of the labour force in public employment. If public 
sector employees truly constituted an influential interest group, it is hard to see how 
the Kenyan and Tanzanian governments could have succeeded in reducing real 
wages by such amounts. While some public sector employees may well have gained 
from the economic uncertainties of the 1970s and 1980s by capitalising on the price 
distortions and income opacity, the majority would surely have favoured wage stability 
and slower employment growth. 
As a result, the share of public sector employees in the top income or consumption 
deciles roughly halved. While public sector-headed households constituted in the 
order of 36% of households in the top income decile in Kenya in 1975, this share had 
dropped to 30% by 1994 and 17% by 2005/06. The Tanzanian public sector share of 
the top 10% of income earners started lower, falling from an estimated 25% in 1969 
to 14% in 2011/12. In tandem the public sector share of the top percentile fell by a 
similar magnitude. These declines were sharper in the capital cities than in rural and 
more peripheral regions, suggesting that the growing urban metropolises have 
undergone the most extensive structural change.  
In both Kenya and Tanzania the share of public sector-headed households in the top 
10% is today lower than in the United Kingdom. In the UK the public sector shares 
tapered off in the top percentiles however, a pattern that is less stark in Africa. In Kenya 
the public sector share appears to taper off marginally in the top percentiles, while in 
Tanzania the very top of the income distribution remains more strongly dominated by 
public servants. 
Despite the large fall in public sector salaries in the 1970s and 1980s it appears that 
the structural adjustment reforms of the 1990s that had the biggest impact on the 
public sector share of top incomes, with most of the decline in both the top decile and 
percentile happening between the early 1990s and late 2000s (although the estimates 
from the 1960s and 1970s come with a large margin of error). It appears that in the 
1980s and early 1990s, at least some public sector-headed households successfully 
off-set the effects of falling base salaries by relying on multiple income sources, 
including farming, small enterprises and the wage earnings of other household 
members. This raises further questions about the beholdeness of East Africa’s public 
servants. With a relatively large share of their household income derived from sources 
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other than their government wage, their economic interests may not in fact be those 
of a salaried class.80  
This story of change provides a cautiously optimistic tale. Both at the very top and 
among the broader ‘middle class’, those households at the fore of the income 
distribution during East Africa’s economic recovery in the 2000s are primarily 
households in the private sector. Compared to the first two decades of independence, 
a larger share of the relatively prosperous Kenyan and Tanzanians are today business 
owners and employees at banks and in other service jobs, suggesting that Frantz 
Fanon’s derided ‘bourgeoisie of the civil service’ may no longer be a considerable 
social force.  
How these trends will play out in the future, however, are far from certain. Kenya’s 
2010 decision to devolve power to county governments has raised concerns that local 
governments are beginning to expand the level of public employment as well as 
creating a new tier of high-paying political posts at local level.81 This may boost the 
importance of public sector jobs in county capitals, but could also trigger future wage 
deciles. It may also lead to a continued divergence between the employment 
distribution in Nairobi and Mombasa and those in the peripheral towns. Economic 
setbacks could also slow the ongoing transition, if falling demand reduced the growth 
of high-paying private sector jobs.  
Nonetheless, this paper has underscored that African economies have been far from 
static over the past half-century and are unlikely to become so in the future. Political 
economy interpretations of the continents postcolonial performance need to take 
greater cognizance of the dramatic changes to the structure of household earnings in 
the decades since independence, and identify the winners and losers of these shifts 
in different eras. Public sector employment was an important source of income for 
comparatively well-off Kenyans and Tanzanians at independence, but the political and 
social status of public sector employees ebbed and flowed over the following decades.  
                                                          
80
 This argument has also been made by Neubert, 2016. 
81
 Michelle D’Arcy and Agnes Cornell, ‘Devolution and Corruption in Kenya: Everyone’s Turn to Eat?’, 
African Affairs, 115.459 (2016), 246–73. 
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Appendix 1: Data sources for Figure 4 
 
Employment and earnings 
Kenya Annual Enumeration of Employees Survey, tables published in: 
 1946-1960: Kenya Statistical Abstracts, 1955 - 1962 
 1961–1990: Kenya: Economic Survey, 1960 – 1990 
 1991-2010: Kenya Statistical Abstracts, 1991-2010 
Tanzania* Survey of Employment and Earnings  
 1961 – 1984: Bureau of Statistics Tanzania, Survey of employment and 
earnings 
Payroll records of government employment, cited in: 
 1981-2010: World Bank, Tanzania Public Expenditure Reviews, 1989, 1994, 
1996, 2000, 2004 and 2010 
Total government personnel expenditure 
 1981 – 2010: IMF Recent Economic Developments and Article IV Staff 
Monitoring Reports 
*Note: Tanzania average government wage series constructed from average earnings for male citizen 
in the government services sector for period 1960 – 1978; after that the average is based on the total 
government wage bill divided by general government employment (imputed for missing years).  
Cost of living indices 
Kenya  1948 – 1960: Kenya: Statistical Abstract (Nairobi cost of living index) 
 1961 – 2012: World Development Indicators (Inflation, Consumer prices) 
Tanzania  1947 – 1965: Monthly statistical bulletin (Dar es Salaam wage earners index 
of consumer prices) 
 1965 – 2012: World Development Indicators (Consumer price index) 
GDP 
 World Bank (2014), World Development Indicators, http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-
development-indicators 
 Pre-1960 (Kenya): PENN World Tables: Feenstra, Robert C., Robert Inklaar and Marcel P. Timmer 
(2013), "The Next Generation of the Penn World Table" www.ggdc.net/pwt 
Population* 
 Pre-1960: Ewout Frankema and Morten Jerven, ‘Writing History Backwards or Sideways: Towards 
a Consensus on African Population, 1850-Present’, Economic History Review, 67.4 (2014), 907–
31. 
 1960- Present: World Bank (2014), World Development Indicators, http://data.worldbank.org/data-
catalog/world-development-indicators 
 
*Note: labour force estimated as a fixed percentage of the working age population (15-64), based on 
recent estimates of labour force participation available in World Development Indicators. 
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Appendix 2: Regional distribution of earnings: Figure 8 
Figure 8 was constructed by using regionally disaggregated data on the population and the total number 
of public/formal sector employees. The public/government employee to population ratio and formal 
sector employee to population ratio was calculated for each district in Kenya and Tanzania and each 
region in Tanzania. I then calculate the coefficient of variation across these data points by year and plot 
how the CoV changed over time. Note that in the Tanzanian the measure only includes general 
government employees (i.e., it excludes the parastatal sector).  
The table below provides detail on the data sources used for the analysis. 
Kenya Formal sector employment 
1972 – 2005: EES 
Public sector employment 
1972 – 1985: EES 
1994: WMS 
2009: Census 
Total population 
Censuses from 1969, 1979, 1989, 1999, 2009 (population assumed to grow 
linearly between census years), 1994 data point using estimated district 
population from survey. 
Tanzania Government and formal sector employment 
1965 – 1980: EES; 1993 human resource development survey, 2000/01 and 
2011/12 household budget surveys 
Total population 
Censuses from 1967, 1978, 1988. For data points using household surveys, 
regional population estimates taken from the surveys. 
 
The subnational boundaries in all three countries have changed over time. The data has been 
constructed on the basis of the 1970s boarders, see description below. 
Kenya 
To keep the sample constant over time, the original 41 Kenyan district divisions of the 1970s are used 
in this paper, clustered into 8 provinces. Kenya’s administrative divisions have undergone 
considerable change since independence. Under President Moi and President Kibaki the number of 
districts in Kenya was increased, and as a result the censuses contain an increasing number of 
districts (69 in 1999, 158 in 2009). However, a High Court ruling in 2009 deemed 210 of the then 
existing 256 districts illegal, and reverted the administrative structure back to the 46 districts and 
Nairobi as set out in the Districts and Provinces Act of 1992. When the 2010 Constitution came into 
effect in 2013, these districts were converted into 47 counties, which form the basis for the devolution 
envisaged under the new constitution.  
Thankfully, new Kenyan districts were carved out of single old districts, making it a relatively 
straightforward task to merge new districts into old ones. The mapping below shows how any new 
district divisions have been merged into the original 1972 list. 
   Master list New districts mapped onto old 
110 Nairobi   
205 Kirinyaga   
208 Kiambu Thinka 
220 Nyandaura   
221 Nyeri   
222 Muranga Maragua 
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301 Mombasa   
303 Kwale   
306 Kilifi Malindi 
309 Tana River   
311 Lamu   
320 Taita Taveta   
401 Marsabit Moyale 
405 Isiolo   
415 Embu Mbeere 
421 Machakos Makueni 
430 Kitui Mwingi 
431 Meru 
Meru South, North, Central, 
Tharaka 
501 Garissa   
520 Wajir   
521 Mandera   
601 Siaya Bondo 
630 Kisumu Nyando 
632 Kisii Kisii Central, Kisii South, North Kisii 
634 South Nyanza 
Homa Bay, Migori, Suba, 
Rachuonyo, Kuria 
704 West Pokot   
713 Baringo Koibatek 
730 Nakuru   
739 Kericho Bomet, Buret 
750 Turkana   
751 Samburu   
752 Trans Nzoia   
753 Nandi   
754 Laikipia   
755 Narok Trans Mara 
756 Kajiado   
757 Elgeyo Markwet Marakwet, Keiyo 
758 Uasin Gishu   
816 Busia Teso 
830 Kakamega Vihiga, Lugari, Butere 
832 Bungoma Mt. Elgon 
NB. Other categories excluded (overall share of pop minimal) 
Tanzania 
Tanzania’s regions have undergone less change than Kenya’s districts but some of the regions created 
in 1978 and 2012 have been carved out of more than one original region. As the employment data is 
not available at district level, I have made the simplifying assumption that a new region was drawn in 
equal proportion between old regions. This assumption makes a negligible difference to the results. In 
addition, there were some boundary changes between 1967 and 1978. The 1967 regional populations 
were calculated using the 1978 boundaries in the 1978 preliminary census report. 
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Regions 1967 2002 2012 
Arusha   Manyara added to Arusha 
Manyara added to 
Arusha 
Pwani (Coast) Mzizima District removed  
    
Dar es Salaam  Mzizima District added  
    
Dodoma   
    
Iringa   
  
Njombe included in 
Iringa 
Kigoma   
    
Kilimanjaro   
    
Mara   
    
Mbeya   
    
Morogoro   
    
Mtwara   
    
Mwanza   
  
Half of Simiyu pop and 
third Geita pop 
Ruvuma   
    
Shinyanga   
  
Half of Simiyu pop and 
third Geita pop 
Singida   
    
Tabora   
    
Tanga   
    
Kagera/West 
Lake     Third Geita pop 
Lindi Emp estimated as share Mtwara     
Rukwa Emp estimates as share of Mbeya and Tabora   
Katavi included in 
Rukwa 
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Appendix 3: Formal sector distribution: Figure 5 
The data points for this figure come from the Enumeration of Employees Surveys, see sources listed in 
Appendix 1; the 1990 estimate for Tanzania uses the 1990/91 labour force survey instead. The 
Tanzanian measure changed slightly over time; the estimates for 1963 and 1965 are based on adult 
African male employees only, while the 1970 measure includes all adult male citizens. The data from 
1976 and on in contrast covers both men and women. 
Both the data on public sector wages and household incomes (in the 1960s and 70s) is given in the 
form of number of employees/households per wage group, see example below for Tanzania 1969. For 
the purpose of the comparisons in this chapter, it is necessary to transform this wage group data into a 
continuous distribution. 
Figure 9. Tanzania: distribution of public sector employees by wage group, 1969 
Wage 
group (shs 
month) 
# employees 
<100           1,844  
100-124        13,010  
125-149        13,614  
150 - 199        41,809  
200-299        32,202  
300-399        18,845  
400-499           6,521  
500-749        11,309  
750-999           5,848  
>1000        11,552  
I use a simple, shortcut approach in order to recalibrate these bins into even deciles by simply assuming 
a linear distribution within each wage group.82 Converting the 1969 data above into even bin sizes to 
facilitate comparison with other data imposes the following pattern to the data (Figure 10).  
Figure 10. Tanzania: distribution of public sector employees by wage group, 1969, assuming 
linear distribution within bins  
 
                                                          
82
 Following the example of Richard Weisskoff, Income Distribution and Economic Growth in Puerto 
Rico, Argentina and Mexico, Review of Income and Wealth, 1970; Michael Hodd, ‘Income Distribution 
in Kenya (1963–72)’, The Journal of Development Studies, 12.3 (1976), 221–28.  
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A more sophisticated approach that smooths the distribution, thus reducing the step changes between 
brackets brought about by arbitrary bin sizes, is to model the distribution assuming a log-normal 
probability distribution. There is a considerable literature that argues that income data tends to conform 
well to a log-normal distribution.83 The challenge in this case is that for most of the available data we 
lack knowledge of the mean and standard deviation. The mean and standard deviation are therefore 
estimated so as to minimize the difference between the log-normal distribution and the linear 
distribution. I start by assuming that all observations fall at the mid-point of their respective income 
bracket, and that all observations in the bottom bracket fall at the top cut-off, and all observations in the 
top bracket are twice the bracket cut-off. The mean and standard deviation is then adjusted to minimize 
the difference between the linear interpolation model and the log-normal model. 
For the Tanzanian 1969 data above, this gives the following distribution in comparison to the linear 
approach. The match is relatively good for the upper part of the income distribution but fits less well for 
the bottom part of the distribution. 
As the two approaches give very similar results for the top decile estimates, however, I choose to report 
only the simpler approach, which assumes a linear distribution within bins. This simplification appears 
to make only a small difference to the reported results and does not alter the basic story of change. 
Figure 11. Tanzania: distribution of public sector employees by wage group, 1969, comparing 
the two estimation methods 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
83
 See previous use by: Maxim Pinkovskiy and Xavier Sala-i-Martin, Parametric Estimations of the 
World Distribution of Income, NBER Working Paper Series (Cambridge, Mass.). 
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Appendix 4: Kenyan data sources: Figure 6, Tables 6-8 
4.1  The 1975 distribution 
Kenya did not undertake any comprehensive household budget surveys in the 1960s or 1970s and 
reconstructions of the income distribution therefore rely on data from several sources. Several authors 
have used data from the various iterations of the Integrated Rural Surveys, in combination with other 
sources, to establish a rough distribution and inequality estimates.84 Because these studies were 
foremost about poverty, and thus the bottom of the distribution, they tend to have relatively large, 
undifferentiated brackets at the top. I therefore use the most detailed of the rural income distribution 
tables I could find, constructed by Smith (1978) based on the 1974/75 Integrated Rural Survey. As this 
survey only covered small-holder households (roughly 75% of the population), other sources are used 
to add the missing households to this distribution. Large farming households are added to this 
distribution based on data reported in the statistical abstract, along with the data on formal sector wages 
(from the EES), self-employed (income tax statistics report), and urban informal sector (informal sector 
survey), and rough estimates of the pastoral population from Collier and Lal (1980).  This is a rough 
calculation, and relies on a number of simplifying assumptions in order to reconcile the data from 
different surveys. Table 15 shows the full distribution and indicates the source of data for each sector. 
The sources and assumptions discussed below. 
Table 15. Constructed income distribution for Kenya, thousands of households, 1975 
 (1) (2) (3) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)  
 Income 
groups, 
KSh/month 
Small 
holders 
Large 
farms 
Public 
sector 
(male) 
Private 
sector 
(male) 
Self-
employe
d (formal) 
Informal 
sector 
(urban) Pastoral 
Other 
rural TOTAL 
IRS 
1974/75 
Large 
farm 
survey EES EES 
Income 
tax 
annual 
report 
Informal 
sector 
survey85 
Collier 
and Lal 
Resid
ual   
0-89 192   2 13     40 38 285 
90-189 368   7 137     40 38 590 
190-389 415   57 90   44 40 38 684 
390-579 137   75 39   7 40 38 335 
580-990 94   75 34 2 8     213 
990+ 26 3 48 37 14 2     129 
TOTAL 1233 3 264 349 17 62 160 150 2237 
 
Table 16. Constructed income distribution for Kenya, percentage of each income bracket, 1975 
 Income groups, 
KSh/month Public sector Private sector 
Self-employed 
and informal 
Agricultural 
and pastoral 
Income bracket 
share of total hhs 
0-89 1% 5% 0% 95% 13% 
90-189 1% 23% 0% 76% 26% 
190-389 8% 13% 6% 72% 31% 
390-579 22% 12% 2% 64% 15% 
580-990 35% 16% 5% 44% 10% 
                                                          
84
 E. Crawford and E. Thorbecke, Employment, Income Distribution, Poverty Alleviation and Basic 
Needs in Kenya (Geneva, 1978); L.D. Smith, Kenya: Low Income Smallholder Marketing and 
Consumption Patterns: Analysis and Improvement Policies and Programmes (Rome, 1978); Paul 
Collier and Deepak Lal, Poverty and Growth in Kenya, World Bank Staff Working Papers (Washington 
D.C., 1980); Livingstone. 
85
 Results reported in: Crawford and Thorbecke. 
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990+ 37% 29% 12% 22% 6% 
TOP 10% 36% 23% 9% 32% 10% 
 
(1) Small holders comprised 55% of total households. The income distribution in the small holder sector 
draws on the Integrated Rural Survey from 1974/75.86 Smith (1978) calculated an income distribution 
based on this survey which presented number of ‘adult equivalents’ by income group (in KSh per 
annum). Adult equivalents were calculated by giving all adults aged 15 and above a weight of 1, and all 
children below 15 a weight of  0.5. For the purposes of this paper the distribution was recalculated into 
monthly KSh. per household, assuming an average household size of 6.7 (based on IRS 1974/75), and 
presuming that 50% of household members were below the age of 15 (based on 1969 census). 
Furthermore, as remittances were included as a form of income, the income cut-offs were lowered 
slightly on the basis of the average remittance share of income. Lastly, the IRS also included a 
significant share of households in the top brackets that were headed by formal sector employees; of 
households in the top income bracket for instance, 27% of that income was earned from regular or 
casual employment. I therefore adjust the number of households downwards to account for those whose 
main form of income was from paid employment, thus avoiding double counting as these households 
will also be captured by the enumeration of employees. 
Note that in contrast to the assumptions made by Crawford and Thorbecke (1978), the so-called 
intermediate or gap farms with holdings of between 20-50 acres (8-20 hectare) are assumed to be 
captured by the small holder survey, as the total estimated holdings of 8 hectare and above roughly 
match the number reported in the 1979 intermediate farm survey.  
(2) Kenyan authorities defined farms of over 50 acres as large farms. These were land holdings in the 
former scheduled areas, and there were roughly 3,000 such farms in 1975.87 I assume that all 3,000 
large farm households had incomes that placed them in the top income bracket.  
(3) Formal sector employee households are calculated from the 1975 Enumeration of Employees 
Survey (reported in the Statistical Abstract). This survey reports the number of employees by wage 
group. The female share of each wage group is subtracted from the total to give the number of male 
employees by wage bracket, to avoid double counting. I then assume that each male employee is the 
head of one household and his earnings are the household’s sole source of income. This is a 
problematic assumption, as many households headed by employees in formal employment had other 
sources of income that would have raised their overall household income. Thus the formal sector shares 
in the top income brackets are likely to be under-estimated. As the wage brackets do not overlap 
perfectly with the income group brackets given by the IRS, I assume a linear distribution of employees 
within each bracket. This simplification makes very little difference to the overall results. 
(4) Data on self-employed, high income households is taken from the income tax department annual 
report for 1974. It assumes that each tax unit is a household, and the reported taxable income their total 
household earnings for that year. 
(5) Informal sector workers in the urban areas are estimated based on the 1975 informal sector survey 
(republished in Crawford and Thorbecke, Appendix B). This survey gives average earnings by industrial 
sub-group. These workers are assigned to income brackets on the basis of the average earnings in 
their respective industrial sub-group. I assume the same male share of workers as in the formal sector 
(85%) and thus subtract 15% from each bracket. 
                                                          
86
 Kenya. Central Bureau of Statistics., Integrated Rural Survey 1974/75: Basic Report (Nairobi, 
1977). 
87
 Reported in: Kenya. Central Bureau of Statistics. Statistical Abstract 1980.  
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(6) The number of pastoral households is taken from Collier and Lal, 1980. They are assumed to be 
distributed evenly in the bottom brackets. This is an arbitrary decision, but as they are unlikely to be 
found in the top decile or percentile, this is unlikely to affect the reported results. 
(7) The missing rural households (presumed to be squatters or landless households) are calculated as 
a residual (based on the total population size) and distributed evenly in the bottom brackets. This is an 
arbitrary decision, but as they are unlikely to be found in the top decile or percentile, this is unlikely to 
affect main the reported results.  
The top 10% is calculated from the top two brackets, weighting the top bracket by 0.6 and the second 
by 0.4, thus capturing the top 10% of the distribution. 
The top 1% estimate for 1975 is calculated solely from the income tax department annual report and 
enumeration of employees, assuming that all those with incomes that put them in the top 1% would pay 
taxes and making adjustments for women. 
Table 17. Composition of top 1% of households 
 Public  Private  Self-employed TOTAL 
Source EES EES 
Income tax 
statistics report  
# hhs earning 
>KSh.3000 / month 7 11 7 25 
Share of total 29% 46% 25% 100% 
 
 4.2  The 1994 and 2005/06 household surveys 
Table 18. Details of Kenyan surveys used in analysis 
 Welfare Monitoring Survey 2, 1994* Kenya Integrated Household 
Budget Survey 2005-2006 
Coverage National National 
Sample size (households) 11,279 13,430 
Sampling frame National Sample Surveys and 
Evaluation Programme (NASSEP III) 
sample frame, based on the 1989 
Population and Housing Census 
NASSEP IV sampling frame, based 
on the 1999 Population and 
Housing Census 
Sampling Three-stage sampling technique, 
sampling by enumeration area, cluster 
and household, for a total of 1,377 
clusters and 11,279 households. 
Sampling was stratified by district and 
urban/rural status.   
It covered 1,343 clusters, selected 
randomly on a district basis, and 
13,430 households (10 selected 
randomly per cluster), stratified by 
district and urban/rural status. 
Data collection time period Started June 1994 May 2005 - May 2006 
Data collection  Face to face interviews Face to face interviews. 
Households kept diaries to record 
goods and services purchased and 
consumed by the household 
Produced by Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, 
with technical and financial support 
from the World Bank 
Kenya National Bureau of Statistics 
Funded by: Government of Kenya, 
DFID, USAID and General Data 
Dissemination System (GDDS) 
 
*Note: the 1994 WMS was part of a series of three Welfare Monitoring Surveys (1992, 1994 and 
1997). The 1994 survey was chosen for use in this paper because the quality of the survey was 
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superior to that of 1992,88 and because it contained more detailed employment and earnings data 
than the 1997 survey. 
4.3  Construction of variables 
Public sector-headed households: designated household head reports working in the public sector. 
 1994 WMS: Based on variables mainoccu & empsecto, excluding observations where 
respondents report zero income from public sector employment and removing those 
who worked less than 9 months of the proceeding year (unless they were recent hires). 
 2005/06 KIHBS: Based on sector of employment, variable e17, excluding those not 
reporting any wage income. 
A point to note is that the in contrast to the EES the household surveys do not explicitly exclude the 
military, although they tend to be limited to private households and thus exclude army barracks. 
However, the military was only 8% of total public sector employment and their inclusion thus make only 
minor difference to the final results. 
Main economic activity of household head:  
 1994 WMS: Based on variable empsecto 
 2005/06 KIHBS: Based on economic activity, variable e03. Paid employees were 
subsequently divided into public, private and informal sector on the basis of sector of 
employment (e17). In order to reduce the other category (where household head 
reports being retired, looking for job or gave no information), all households in this 
category which reported agricultural income or business incomes of 50% or more of 
household expenditure were recategorized to the agricultural or business/informal 
sectors. 
Total household consumption:  
 1994 WMS: Based on variable hh_expen (total household expenditure). Includes auto-
consumption, but does not impute rent. 
 2005/06 KIHBS: Based on variable hhtexp.  
It should be noted that I do not control for differences in cost of living in different localities. While price 
differences will significantly influence measures of poverty it should have less on an impact at the top 
of the distribution where a larger proportion of consumption is on goods and services marketed 
nationally. 
 
Total household income:  
 1994 WMS: Variable constructed on the basis of all listed income sources, from 
employment, agriculture, business, transfers, rents etc. Includes own consumption. 
Agriculture, livestock and business income is net of all reported expenses. Sale of 
livestock included as a source of income. 
 2005/06 KIHBS: Variable constructed on the basis of all listed income sources. 
Agriculture, livestock and business profits net of reported expenses. Labour costs were 
excluded as it is unclear if the value of family labour was included. Business profits 
recalculated to a 12 month basis; those that reported losses were simply excluded 
(zero business income), to avoid including households with negative income. Only 
family-owned business income included. 
 
                                                          
88
 World Bank, Kenya Poverty Assessment (Washington D.C., 1995)., Annex 1. 
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4.4 Data quality checks 
i. Do the household surveys underestimate the wealthy? 
The systematic under-reporting of top incomes in household surveys is a well acknowledged limitation 
of such sources.89 Household from the top of the distribution tend to be missing both because the 
relative scarcity of such observations which reduces the likelihood that they will be represented in the 
sample in the first place, and because wealthier households tend to be less likely to agree to be 
interviewed.90 This is a particular problem for our analysis when comparing household survey results to 
those of the EES which drew on data from employers. Presuming that the census doesn’t suffer from 
this same bias (given that every household is legally required to participate), we can compare variables 
related to wealth across our surveys to see if the 1994 and 2005/06 surveys appear to under-represent 
the elite (censuses give no income data). One such measure is to compare the educational distribution 
across samples, presuming that higher education is correlated with income. 
Table 19 compares the Kenyan population disaggregated by broad educational attainment level for 
each of the household surveys along with the 1989, 1999 and 2009 census results. It suggests a 
plausible growth in the level of educational attainment over time, with the secondary and tertiary stock 
growing considerably, the primary educated population growing until 2005/06 and then remaining 
constant, and the number of people without any education remaining roughly constant, (growth shown 
in figure 13, where all trends are indexed to 100 in 1989). The 1994 WMS measure of people with 
university degrees looks too high for the overall trend, and is likely explained by the inclusion of people 
in the university category who have some university education rather than a completed university 
degree. Presuming a strong correlation between income and education, it does not appear that under-
enumeration has made a significant dent on the top 10% of the distribution. Given that university 
graduates are only around 1% of the population, and likely concentrated in the top income brackets, 
the fact that their number is not significantly underestimated suggests that the under-enumerated top 
of the distribution is likely to be quite small.  
Table 19. Kenya: number of people by educational attainment, household surveys and 
censuses compared 
 Level of education completed 
(respondents >=10 years old) 1989 1994 1999 2005/06 2009 
None / pre-primary 4,065,300 3,727,437 3,818,800 3,530,151 4,321,240 
Standard 1-8 7,594,460 9,844,807 11,900,920 15,069,541 14,831,710 
Form 1-6 2,282,720 3,421,677 4,026,200 5,858,245 6,882,970 
Trade tests / polytechnics 0 94,923 0   109,660 
University completed 55,520 139,684 142,980 207,066 326,210 
Other / not stated 67,720 236,637 0 102,357 443,190 
 
   
14,065,720  
  
17,465,165  
   
19,888,900  
   
24,767,360  
     
26,914,980  
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Figure 12. Kenya: Growth in stock of people by level of education, household surveys and 
censuses compared (indexed, 1989=100%) 
 
Another way to examine whether the top of the income distribution is under-represented is to 
compare assets or household characteristics associated with wealth. The results below show 
the percentage of households reporting household characteristics associated with income: 
whether the household has a flush toilet, access to electricity, and whether it uses gas as 
cooking fuel (as opposed to paraffin, wood etc.). The electricity series suggests a relatively 
even and plausible growth trajectory. The flush toilet measure shows both the 1994 and 
2005/6 surveys to have shares below the census trends, and the measure of cooking gas 
similarly shows a very low level for 1994. These results suggest that there may be some under-
representation of the elite but the missing share is likely quite small – possibly in the order of 
1%.  
Table 20. Percentage of population with elite characteristics, household survey and censuses 
compared 
Household characteristics (% 
of households) 
1989 
census 
1994 
WMS 
1999 
census 
2005/06 
KIHBS 
2009 
census 
Toilet (flush/WC) (in dwelling) 9.7% 8.9% 10.0% 8.4%   
Electricity 8.9% 10.2% 13.8% 18.3% 22.2% 
Gas as main cooking fuel 2.7% 1.5% 2.4% 3.6% 4.9% 
 
ii. The public sector sample: reliability of reported level of employment and income 
Lastly, I examine how well these surveys capture public sector workers, as compared to the Kenyan 
administrative and census data. On the whole the household surveys and the 2009 census tend to over-
estimate the number of public sector employees, as compared to administrative data, as demonstrated 
in the chart below which plots all available household datasets against the EES series. The 2005/06 
survey, however, is very close to the administrative data (it also has the most detailed questions about 
sector of employment), while the 1994 WMS significantly overestimates the size of the public service, 
even after we exclude inconsistent entries. 
Given that the survey sampling appears relatively robust, one possible explanation for this inconsistency 
is a looser definition of public sector employee in the household surveys, and possibly also a failure of 
the central government to properly account for all staff in its administrative records. Keep in mind that 
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the EES captures data from employers while the household surveys interview employees.  The question 
in the household survey is generally phrased “who does [RESPONDENT] work for?”, with a list of 
allowable answers that include either general public sector category, or a breakdown by broad arm of 
government (central, local, teachers service commission etc.). One likely difference is that when posed 
the question, people who are not formally on the government payroll (contractors, consultants, short-
term casual labourers – a cleaner at a school paid by a community contribution), will also identify with 
a public sector employer, while the government’s administrative data uses a more stringent definition 
based on contract type. There also seem to be genuine transcription errors (although these ought to be 
randomly distributed).  
Table 21. Kenya: Estimates of number of public sector employees (‘000) by data source 
 
The 1994 WMS estimates a considerably larger number of public sector employees – 990,000 
compared to 688,000 in the EES for 1994. Removing inconsistent entries and those who worked for 
less than 9 months in the past year reduces it to 880,000 – still 28% larger than EES. Average earnings 
are reported as lower in the WMS, at Shs.4,111/month91 compared to Shs.4,607/month according to 
the EES (11% lower), which supports the hypothesis that the WMS is capturing more low-skilled and 
poorly remunerated casual workers. 
In Table 23 we break down public sector employees by industry using the 1994 WMS data and compare 
it to the 1994 EES. The biggest discrepancies are in the agriculture category, which reports far more 
public sector employees than the EES, and public administration (titled general govt in the EES). The 
earning discrepancies are biggest in the sectors dominated by parastatals or frequent use of casual 
labour – construction, electricity/water, trade and finance, while in education and health for instance, 
the averages are relatively close. This further supports the hypothesis that the over-estimation is due 
to the inclusion of low-skilled, part-time or contract workers who are not captured fully by the 
administrative data. This bias then should have less of an effect at the top of the income distribution 
(our main interest). Moreover, to the extent that it does reflect poor sampling, it should bias the public 
sector share by consumption decile upward – the 1994 shares may thus be slightly lower than reported 
and the drop between 1976 and 1994 in fact larger than suggested above. 
                                                          
91
 Because the earnings data is collected so as to facilitate annual earnings, this estimate is based 
only on monthly earners and those daily and weekly earners who report working for the entire year. 
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Table 22. Kenya: Estimates of public sector employees by industry, EES 1994 vs. WMS 1994 
  
 Industry 
Total employees Monthly earnings (Shs.) 
EES 1994 WMS 1994 EES 1994 WMS 1994 
Agriculture            67,934  150,345            2,318                   2,993  
Mining and quarrying                  717  3,511            5,516                   3,462  
Manufacturing            39,311  32,062            4,146                   3,286  
Construction            29,323  26,610            4,016                   3,338  
Electricity/water            20,820  18,591            7,115                   5,380  
Transport/Storage            40,653  50,818            6,258                   6,138  
Wholesale/Retail trade & Restaurants               6,942  18,297            5,728                   3,722  
Finance, Insurance, Real estate etc.            17,892  15,660          11,207                   5,099  
General Government / Public 
Administration            76,294  237,701            4,723                   4,108  
Education          217,180  266,335            3,043                   4,157  
Health            52,271  55,255 4,372                   4,517  
Other          118,282  115,775 -    
TOTAL          687,619        990,960  4,607                  4,111  
 
For 2005/06 however, we have the opposite problem, if on a milder scale. The table below compares 
the 2005/06 survey with the EES for 2005, and finds the estimates to be relatively consistent on both 
an aggregate and disaggregated basis, if marginally lower than the EES estimate. 
Table 23. Kenya: Estimates of public sector employees by branch of government, EES 2005 vs. 
KHBS 2005/6 
 
Number of employees Average earnings* 
Standard 
deviation 
 
EES 
2005 
KHBS 
2005/06 EES 2005 
KHBS 
2005/06 
KHBS 
2005/06 
Central government 189,500 223,526      17,432       17,764          15,460  
Local government 87,600 85,948  15,608**       16,178          27,538  
Teachers service commission 232,800 208,465      20,407       19,636          10,931  
Majority-owned public companies 46,900 45,254      48,897       29,861          37,558  
Parastatals/SOEs 97,500 83,399      37,015       21,343          36,868  
Total 654,300 646,592    
 
Figure 13 compares the wage distribution in the two datasets. It is not entirely clear however, whether 
the EES wage group data for 2005 includes benefits or only base pay. Nevertheless, comparing the 
total public sector distribution for the two data sources, both with and without allowances for the KHBS 
data, shows a reasonably consistent, if not perfect fit. If anything, it appears that the EES data rather 
than the household survey data, underestimates the right-hand tail.  
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Figure 13. Kenya: public sector wage distribution, EES 2005 vs. KHBS 2005/06 
 
In Table 25 we also compare the public sector sample by educational attainment to the 2009 population 
and housing census, the only one of Kenya’s recent censuses to provide data on sector of employment. 
Note that the EES does not provide a disaggregation of employment by educational attainment and 
therefore our only anchor is the 2009 census. The 1997 WMS is also added to give one further year of 
observation.  
Table 24. Kenya: Public sector employees by educational attainment, different surveys 
Age above 25 1994 1997 2005/06 2009 
None / pre-primary 45,064 20,595 23,661 14,020 
Standard 1-8 231,753 134,152 100,251 78,430 
Form 1-6 and college 541,812 466,076 472,926 446,680 
University 45,593 52,302 45,561 94,740 
Other 53,668 41,242 24,842 8,010 
TOTAL 917,890 714,367 667,241 641,880 
Percentage terms     
None / pre-primary 5% 3% 4% 2% 
Standard 1-8 25% 19% 15% 12% 
Form 1-6 and college 59% 68% 71% 70% 
University 5% 7% 7% 15% 
Other 6% 6% 4% 1% 
 
Overall the findings are relatively consistent with earlier observations. The 1994 survey clearly over-
estimates the number of unskilled and primary educated public sector employees, as shown by the 
rapid fall in these categories between the 1994 and 1997 WMS. In the higher educational categories 
(secondary and tertiary), the 1994 estimations look more plausible, given the rapid growth in educational 
attainment over this same period. 
Of greater worry is the underestimation of university graduates in the 2005/06 sample compared to 
1997 and 2009. While the number of university graduates was rising rapidly over this time, the 
discrepancy within the public sector sample is larger than that for the labour force as a whole, which 
suggests that a disproportionate share of the most highly educated and thus highly paid civil servants 
were under-sampled or chose not to partake in the survey. The biggest discrepancy are in Nairobi and 
the Central province, which are also the areas which are comparatively under-sampled (weights are 
considerably higher for these two provinces). This may bias our estimates of the public sector share of 
the top decile downwards.  
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By estimating the number of missing entries of university educated public sector employees we can 
provide some rough parameters for the possible size of the bias that this may be imposing in Figure 6 
and Tables 6-7. Between 1999 and 2009 the stock of university graduates grew by roughly 6% per year; 
assuming a similar rate of growth in the number of public servants with university education puts the 
corrected 2005/06 number at 75,000 instead of 45,000, i.e. 30,000 more. Assuming that all of these 
graduates are household heads and that all have incomes that place them in the top decile (a generous 
assumption), raises the public sector-headed household share of the top decile from 17% to 20%.  While 
not insignificant, this does not change the broader trend; even with such a correction the 2005/06 public 
sector middle class share still represents a considerable decline compared to 1994 (30%). Furthermore, 
the paper includes alternative estimates on the public sector share of the top strata by using asset 
wealth to stratify households. This analysis (Table 7) includes results using the 2009 census, which 
provides a much larger sample (10% of the population) and therefore more reliable results. It too 
confirms the downward trend in public sector shares of the wealthy. 
Appendix 5: Tanzanian data sources 
5.1 The 1969 distribution 
The 1969 estimate was derived by comparing the 1969 national income distribution (on a cash basis) 
with the salaries of public and formal private sector employees (given by the EES) (Table 26). As in the 
Kenyan analysis, this comparison rests on the assumption that gross public sector cash earnings are a 
good approximation of the total income of public sector-headed households. This will underestimate 
earnings somewhat, as the 1969 survey results showed that employees in the services industry 
(primarily government) earned on average 82% of household cash earnings from wages and salaries 
and the other 18% from a variety of sources (crops, trade and business).  
Possibly biasing the public sector share upward instead however, is that the income data in the national 
distribution table excluded production for own-consumption and therefore underestimates the incomes 
of rural households. This should have less of an impact on incomes among the top 10% and top 1%, 
as own-production of food is presumably a fairly small share of total consumption at these income 
levels. 
Table 25. Employment by wage group, reproduced from EES, 1969  
TSh./annum TSh./month 
All employees 
(adult male 
citizens) 
Government 
(adult male 
citizens) 
Parastatal 
(adult male 
citizens) 
Public (total) 
(adult male 
citizens) 
Private sector 
(adult male 
citizens) 
<1200 <100                11,987                    1,457                   387               1,844        10,143  
1200 - 1499 100-124                24,091                 11,947                1,063             13,010        11,081  
1500 - 1800 125-149                28,041                 10,000                3,614             13,614        14,427  
1800 - 2400 150 - 199                68,767                 33,450                8,359             41,809        26,958  
2400 - 3600 200-299                50,402                 21,990              10,212             32,202        18,200  
3600 - 4800 300-399                26,411                 13,212                5,633             18,845           7,566  
4800 - 6000 400-499                10,583                    5,033                1,488               6,521           4,062  
6000 - 9000 500-749                17,900                    9,048                2,261             11,309           6,591  
9000 - 12000 750-999                   5,642                    2,570                1,278               3,848           1,794  
>12000 >1000                   9,607                    4,082                2,070               6,152           3,455  
 Total              253,431               112,789              36,365           149,154      104,277  
Note: orange cells denotes income thresholds common to both the EES and the household survey 
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Table 26. Tanzania 1969: Estimated public sector share by household income bracket, EES 
(grey), total households from 1969 household income survey 
TSh. /year % of households 
Total 
households 
General 
govt 
Parastatal 
sector 
Public 
sector 
(total) 
Private 
sector  
Govt 
empl. 
share 
of 
income 
group 
Parastatal 
emp. 
share of 
income 
group 
Public 
sector 
share 
of 
income 
group 
Private 
sector 
share 
of 
income 
group 
0-1499 78% 2,184,000  13,404  1,450  14,854  21,224  1% 0% 1% 1% 
1500-3599 16% 448,000  65,440  22,185  87,625  59,585  15% 5% 20% 13% 
3600-5999 4% 112,000  18,245  7,121  25,366  11,628  16% 6% 23% 10% 
6000-
11999 1% 41,720  11,618  3,539  15,157  8,385  28% 8% 36% 20% 
>12000 1% 14,560  4,082  2,070   6,152  3,455  28% 14% 42% 24% 
Total 
  2,800,280  112,789  36,365  149,154  104,277          
 
5.2.  Tanzania household surveys, 1993, 2000/01 and 20111/2 
Table 27. Details of Tanzanian surveys used in analysis 
 1993 Human Resource 
Development Survey 
2000/01 National 
Household Budget 
Survey 
2011/12 National 
Household Budget 
Survey 
Coverage National, including 
Zanzibar (excl. for this 
analysis) 
Mainland Tanzania Mainland Tanzania 
Sample size 
(households) 
4,953 22,178 10,186 
Sampling frame National Master Sample 
frame 
National Master 
Sample frame, based 
on 1988 census 
National Master 
Sample frame, based 
on 2002 census 
Sampling Drew from all of the 222 
clusters of the National 
Master Sample frame, 
although two had to be 
excluded due to 
inaccessibility. 
two-stage sampling on 
the basis of the 
National Master 
Sample; 1,161 
primary sampling units 
were selected (621 
urban and 540 rural), 
and within these, 24 
households from each 
PSU 
Households drawn 
from 400 clusters (120 
from Dar es Salaam, 
120 from other urban 
areas, and 160 from 
rural areas). 
Response rate  
 The replacement rate 
(where the originally 
selected households 
could not be located 
or contacted) was 
relatively high, at 
12%. 
The response rate (for 
originally selected 
households) was 94% 
(out of a planned 
sample of 10,400), 
and a further 398 
replacement 
households were 
added to increase the 
sample size to 
10,18692 
Data collection time 
period 
Sept-Oct 1993 May 2000 – June 
2001 
October 2011 and 
October 2012 
                                                          
92
 The United Republic of Tanzania, Household Budget Survey Main Report, 2011/12 (Dar es 
Salaam, 2014). 
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Data collection  
 Each household was 
visited regularly 
throughout a month, 
to assemble monthly 
data on household 
expenditures (two 
households a month 
in each PSU). 
Expenditure and 
consumption was 
tracked over a 28 day 
period, with each 
household member 
above the age of 5 
given a diary to record 
purchases and 
consumption. 
Produced by University of Dar es 
Salaam with support 
from British Overseas 
Development 
Administration, the 
Government of Japan 
and the World Bank 
National Bureau of 
Statistics 
National Bureau of 
Statistics 
 
5.4 Construction of variables 
Public sector-headed households: designated household head reports working in the public sector. 
 1993 HRDS: Based on economic activity, variable i24, but excluding households that 
do not report public sector income as a most important or second most important 
household income. 
 2000/01 NHBS: Based on main activity, variable s2q08a. Those who reported zero 
employment income were excluded. 
 2011/12 NHBS: Based on main economic activity, variable S12Q20. Inconsistent 
entries were removed (roughly 5% of entries); those that reported a public sector 
employer but not paid employment as an activity, nor any income from this employer. 
A point to note is that the in contrast to the EES the household surveys do not explicitly exclude the 
military, although they tend to be limited to private households and thus exclude army barracks. 
However, the military was only 4% of total public sector employment and their inclusion thus make only 
minor difference to the final results. 
Main economic activity of household head:  
 1993 HRDS: Based on economic activity, variable i24. Those who reported public 
sector employment but did not report income from this source have been recoded on 
the basis of their main reported source of income. 
 2000/01 NHBS: Based on main activity, variable s2q08a. 
 2011/12 NHBS: Calculated based on S12Q9, S12Q10A and S12Q20. 
Total household consumption/expenditure:  
 1993 HRDS: Variable constructed based on data on reported weekly, monthly and 
annual data on expenditure. Dataset contained no aggregate variables so these were 
constructed (multiplying weekly exp with 52 and monthly with 12). Includes in-kind 
(barter) trade but excludes consumption of own-production. 
 2000/01 NHBS: Based on exp_adeq. 
 2011/12 NHBS: Based on totc. Includes consumption of own-production. Unlike other 
surveys it also includes imputed rent.  
It should be noted that I do not control for differences in cost of living in different localities. While price 
differences will significantly influence measures of poverty it should have less on an impact at the top 
of the distribution where a larger proportion of consumption is on goods and services marketed 
nationally. 
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Total household income:  
 1993 HRDS: N/A. Ranking of sources of income by importance from file HR11. 
 2000/01 NHBS: Calculated based on all listed income sources, including employment, 
agriculture and business. Includes production for auto-consumption. Respondents 
asked to estimate income over past 12 months for each income category.  
 2011/12 NHBS: N/A. Does not contain consistent income. 
5.5 Robustness checks 
i. Do the household surveys underestimate the wealthy? 
Household surveys tend to underestimate the number of high income earners, both because they are 
few in number and because wealthier households often decline to partake in surveys. This may bias 
the results if we are missing a large share of the top of the distribution and if this top has different 
economic characteristics to those just below them in the distribution (for instance, if no household in the 
top 3% of the distribution agreed to be interviewed, and public servants comprised the majority of these 
respondents, then their exclusion would bias our public sector share decile results downwards). By 
comparing the household survey population estimates, stratified by characteristics associated with 
wealth, with census results, we can estimate the likely order of magnitude of this under-reporting. As 
all households are by law required to partake in censuses, and as the census questions do not contain 
questions on income, they should provide a reasonably accurate coverage of the entire population, 
including the elite. 
In Table 31 the population (above age 10) is disaggregated by educational attainment. While some of 
the inconsistencies across years are due to differences in classification (as the surveys provide 
inconsistent classifications for qualifications such as diplomas, post-secondary certificates etc.), there 
are some signs of under-reporting, particularly amongst university graduates. The 1993 HRDS did not 
capture a single respondent with a university degree (although with only 0.3% of household heads 
holding such a degree and a sample size of 5,000 households, this is not entirely implausible). The 
2000/01 and 2011/12 household surveys also estimate a lower share of university graduates than the 
corresponding censuses, which provides further indication of under-reporting. In all cases, however, 
the household surveys over-estimate the post-secondary category compared to the census, which may 
also suggest some classification inconsistencies. Either way, the extremely low share of university 
graduates and diploma/certificate holders suggests that this bias will be fairly small. Treating the full 
discrepancy in university graduates between the 2002 census and 2000/01 household survey as 
missing entries would only add 0.3% to the total number of respondents. The effect on our measures 
of the top 10% would thus be marginal.  
Table 28. Tanzania: population estimates by highest level of education achieved (aged 10 and 
above), household surveys and censuses compared 
Educational attainment 
1988 
census 1993 HRDS 
2000/01 
HBS 
2002 
census 
2011/12 
HBS 
2012 
census* 
None or some primary 10,187,140 9,098,559 12,004,522 12,453,990 3,057,718 682,855 
Primary (St.7 and above) 4,811,062 6,612,419 8,930,758 8,924,994 8,930,758 11,230,000 
Secondary (Form IV and 
above) 261,682 507,327 699,634 850,823 1,713,794 1,745,016 
Post-secondary (incl. 
diploma courses) 68,379 87,359 96,192 72,878 249,155 114,922 
University 21,634  32,759 117,588 146,197 324,000** 
Other / unknown 25,567 514,236  2 12,088,245  
Total 15,375,464 16,819,900 21,763,865 22,420,275 26,185,867 14,096,793 
In percentage terms 
None or some primary 66% 54% 55% 56% 12%  
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Primary (St.7 and above) 31% 39% 41% 40% 34%  
Secondary (Form IV and 
above) 2% 3% 3% 4% 7%  
Post-secondary (incl. 
diploma courses) 0.4% 0.5% 0.4% 0.3% 1.0%  
University 0.1% 0.0% 0.2% 0.5% 0.6%  
Other / unknown 0.2% 3.1% 0.0% 0.0% 46%  
*Note: 2012 census report only provides data on respondents who have completed their studies; for 
post-secondary graduates this should not provide any major bias, but means the ‘none’ and ‘primary’ 
categories are significantly smaller than in other years. 
** University and other related education. 
Table 32 repeats this exercise using household characteristics indicative of wealth. It compares the 
share of households reporting high status household characteristics across the household surveys and 
censuses. While there are some inconsistencies that are likely due to data quality problems (it is unlikely 
that electricity access fell between 1993 and 2002 for instance), on the whole the trends are reasonably 
accurate. The household surveys underestimate the share of households with flush toilets marginally, 
while overestimating access to electricity. On the whole the margin of error is in the order of 1-2%. While 
not conclusive, this does suggest that we are capturing a broadly representative share of the top decile, 
although our measures of the top percentile may be less accurate. 
Another point of note moreover, is the low share of households with characteristics associated with 
middle class lifestyles. Less than 10% of Tanzanian households have flush toilets, and only in recent 
years has electricity access exceeded 10%. More than 95% of households still do their household 
cooking over coal or wood fires. This is indicative of just how narrow the Tanzanian elite remains. Even 
our top 10% then, is a fairly diverse group of households, containing households with considerable 
wealth as well as those towards the bottom of the bracket who still live in modest homes without 
electricity or running water. 
Table 29. Tanzania: indicators of household wealth, household surveys and censuses 
compared 
Assets/characteristics, 
% households 
1988 
census 
1993 
HRDS 
2000/01 
HBS 
2002 
census 
2011/12 
HBS 
2012 
census 
Flush toilet 4% 2% 2% 3% 8% 13% 
Electricity 6% 11% 10% 9% 18%  
‘Modern' cooking fuel 
(electricity, gas or 
kerosene)   3% 6% 5% 4% 5% 
 
 
ii. The public sector sample: reliability of estimated level of public employment 
Most of the surveys give reasonable estimates of the total number of public sector employees, albeit 
with an estimate from the 1993 Human Resource Development Survey which is somewhat higher than 
other contemporary sources (even after cleaning of the data).  
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Figure 14. Tanzania: estimated size of public employment (‘000), various sources 
 
The 1993 survey was not designed with labour market analysis in mind and the questions on 
employment are therefore very limited, making it hard to assess the reliability of the measures. 
However, as a simple exclusion criteria, people who report public sector employment as their economic 
activity but do not list public sector pay as an important income source (i.e., first or second most 
important source of income) were excluded from the pubemp variable. Despite this adjustment, the 
number of respondents reporting themselves as working for the government is considerably higher than 
the estimate from administrative sources (479,000 compared to 355,000), while the number in the 
parastatal sector is slightly lower than contemporary sources. Moreover, their educational attainment 
on the whole appears to be lower than what the 1990/91 labour force survey would suggest. The sample 
thus likely includes households relying on occasional or part-time public employment. If only those 
households that reported public sector pay as their main income source were included, the number 
would fall to substantially to 326,000 in the government sector and 90,000 in the parastatal sector. The 
choice of public sector employee definition has some, although not massive, effect on the public sector 
share of the top decile. Without any correction to the variable, the top decile share would rise to 27%; 
using the even tighter defining – those households who report public sector pay as their main source of 
income – the share drops to 20%. 
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